Elite Political Culture and Cosmopolitanism: A Case study of Pakistan (2008-18)

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ABSTRACT

Each state seeks solidarity and stability by ensuring unity and harmony among the socio-cultural and political segments within its territorial jurisdiction. This study looks at the elite political culture in Pakistan that has been highly criticized for stimulating social complexities by proliferating numerous sorts of political, ethnic, religious/sectarian, or linguistic differences. From 1999 to 2007, when a new class of political elites emerged on the surface of electoral politics as the results of 'Devolution Plan 2000', 'condition of graduation for public representatives' and '17th amendment' under the slogan of "Pakistan First"; some court verdicts and constitutional engineering during PPP's third rule upturned respective fruits by bringing back the former elite political culture or traditional elitism as the biggest opposition to populism, political egalitarianism, and democratic liberalism. Therefore, this study conducts a comparative study of PPP and PML(N) regimes (2008-2013 & 2013-2018 respectively) to find out the correlation between elite political culture and political system that is directly proportional to cosmopolitanism. This comparison assists the study to investigate the contributions of post-18th amendment elite political culture to the problematics of democracy during an addressed decade in Pakistan.

Keywords: Democratic Elitism, Elite Political Culture, Post-18th Amendment Political System, Feudalism, Pluralism, Social-Centrism, Pakistan.

INTRODUCTION

Culture typically consists of those attitudes, values, beliefs, ideals, and orientations that predominate in a given society, whereas, political culture consists of the same components but focuses on how those values are translated into people's views of politics, their assessments of political systems, and their role in the polity "(Camp, 2001). It provides a linkage between people and government and explains how the pattern and behavior of any political system are changed. Inglehart is of the view that political culture has a direct and very prominent role in maintaining and strengthening democracy. He argues that mass values have an important bearing on making a democratic system strong. He says that "trust, tolerance, and feelings of efficacy represent 'civic virtues' that enable democratic regimes to function effectively" (Inglehart, 2005: 157). The concept of political culture is not monolithic as it comprises subcultures having diverse characteristics and different social, ethnic, and racial values and orientations.

Elitism can be based upon one family or more than that having an aim to encircle power politics for personal interests. They can belong to distinct races, languages, cultures, religions, sects, or ethnic identities but form a cartel to monopolize the political and state system. Therefore, Deric Shannon and Davita S. Glasberg call such monopolization “elite pluralism” that influences the electoral behavior of the masses; usually in third-world countries like Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (Connolly, 2005: 131-132). At the same time, Gaetano Mosca defines elitism as the ruling class; further divided into political elite and non-political elite that affect socio-political segments morally, materialistically, and intellectually (Volpe, 2021: 02).

The elite political culture of Pakistan has significantly influenced the political institutions and created hurdles in the smooth functioning of the democratic political
structure of the state. In Pakistan, elite political culture is not the product of the 21st century but its roots can be easily traced to the start of European orientalism in British India. Generally, elite political culture in the subcontinent is referred to as feudalism (Chauhan, 2004: 01); however, social sciences academia does not assume feudalism as the sole segment within the elitism but numerous other political and non-political segments are included in it that have power relationships for influencing policy initiatives, democratic elections and economic lifestyle (Leichtman, 2001: 02).

This study analyzes whether the elite political culture in Pakistan during 2008-2018 depicted democratic liberalism and it facilitated cosmopolitanism or not. As the respective period covers the constitutional shift from the 17th amendment to the 18th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, this change provides a logical and rational ground to examine the democratic transition from Musharraf’s military regime. Likewise, this shift also makes the study able to comparatively analyze PPP and PML (N) regimes under the theoretical framework of elitism. This study also analyses the role and behavior of elites either in government or in opposition. This research is qualitative in nature and secondary sources are used.

**ELITISM OR ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE**

Elitism or elite political culture exhibits superiority, exclusiveness, and selectivity within the context of political and state systems. Whether elites belong to political, feudal, or business classes but they perform as unified. On the other hand, all the other non-elite segments are powerless and diverse; can only be influenced by the elite class directly or indirectly. Marxists elite theorists consider democracy as a utopian folly within capitalism (Volpe, 2021: 02-03). Similarly, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca describe that elite political culture covers key political and economic institutions where authority and power exist (Mosca, 2017: 03-08). They think that the psychological aspect of elite political culture is the common belief of the people that elites have personal powerful financial resources, and they must be relying or dependent upon them (Mosca, 2017: 03-08).

US sociologist C. Wright Mills claims that elitism always belongs to power groups within military, economic and political groups and these groups may not be unified but support each other for personal interests. Although, his book “The Power Elite” provides examples from the United States in this regard, but his theoretical framework has also been appreciated within the social sciences academia in other countries (Mills, 1956: 30). At the same time, Floyd Hunter argues that the elite class always defends its legality in terms of “representative democracy” because of the power relationship between clergy, politicians, and businessmen (Marquez, 1985: 01-02).

**COSMOPOLITANISM**

Cosmopolitanism is only unveiled when all the social segments within any state perform as a single community. As a result, cosmopolitanism leads a state towards mutual experiences of cultural, ethnic, political, and religious expressions. According to Kwame Anthony Appiah, cosmopolitanism promotes mutual respect for each social segment within any state (Beck, 2014: 184). Therefore, cosmopolitanism is also called universalism by several scholars (Beck, 2014: 185). The connection between elitism and, cosmopolitanism is only justified within the social sciences academia when elite pluralists follow pragmatism and patriotism. Elitism always stimulates differences among masses just for the sake of fulfilling personal (socio-political and economic) interests within the weak states (Calhoun, 1993; Erdem, 2017; Kurjanska, 2018). Now this study unfolds the pages of history to understand whether the elite political culture in Pakistan facilitated or currently assist the promotion of cosmopolitanism or not.

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE IN PAKISTAN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COSMOPOLITANISM**

Pakistan inherited elite political culture from the folds of British India. Not only was the leading leadership of the All-India Muslim League but the majority of politicians from the Unionist Party had also feudal background. Their socio-political and economic differences had also negatively affected the mainstream politics of Pakistan (Maniruzzaman, 1971: 02-03). From 1947 to 1958, almost 14 fractions emerged from the seeds of the Muslim League, and all were led by elites either from East Pakistan or West Pakistan. Frequent changes in prime ministership during the respective era were a clear indication of a clash of interests among those elites which led the country towards political anarchy and eventually towards the disintegration of both wings of Pakistan.
This era also triggered the cultural, economic, linguistic, social, and political differences among the masses, which can be observed by looking at the results of the elections of provincial assemblies of Punjab and NWFP on March 10-20, 1951, and December 08, 1951, respectively. Elite political leadership in both provinces did not campaign the ensuring patriotism, the state’s solidarity, and cohesion, but their focus was only to get a victory within the constituency from where they were contesting (Maniruzzaman, 1971: 04-06).

Similarly, provincial elections in East Pakistan wiped out the Muslim League from the electoral landscape and the United Front (an alliance of regional political parties, based upon Bengali nationalism) got a huge victory on the bases of stimulating cultural, economic, linguistic, political and social differences from the people of West Pakistan. Political elites (especially feudal, industrialists, and businessmen) of East Pakistan triggered anti-West Pakistan feelings among the masses primarily based on the Bengali language and uneven development which resulted in the widened gulf between both the wings of the country.

The Declaration of One Unit Policy was also criticized by the political leadership of East Pakistan. They took it as a centralization of power by the western province to control the economic and political rights of Bengalis by portraying artificial political egalitarianism. The political situation of the country became deteriorated and finally, the first Martial law was imposed by C-in-C General Muhammad Ayub in October 1958. He also said that the prime motive of his takeover is to eliminate the differences between East and West Pakistan generated by the elite political leadership of both wings (Gupta, 1963: 11-12).

This is a universal phenomenon that a military regime in any country emboldens some selfish politicians to support martial law just for becoming beneficiaries within the coming political system under military patronage. The same happened when Ayub Khan took over the power and Various politicians from East and West Pakistan not only welcomed him but announced their full support for his newly crafted constitution and political system. Ayub Khan introduced the Basic Democracies System and claimed that the BD system would strengthen grass root level democracy in Pakistan and eliminate the sense of deprivation among marginalized and deprived regions and segments of society. Some scholars from social sciences academia like Maya Tudor (2013), Aqil Shah (2014), Christophe Jaffrelot (2016), and Nilofer Siddique, Sahar Shafqat and Mariam Mufti (2020) trace the basic purpose behind inaugurating ‘Basic Democracy’ system (by restructuring centuries-old existing Panchayat system in Bengal) as to promote cosmopolitanism in both wings (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 01-20) but actually, it did not happen. Similarly, another aim to launch ‘Direct Democracy’ was hailed as providing urgent solutions to the problems of the masses at their local level. Therefore, this system was highly appreciated by some of the elites as well as non-elite segments in the state. However, respective 80,000 Basic Democrats were declared as the Electoral College for a presidential election, which was criticized by the majority of political elites of East Pakistan and West Pakistan and, the streets of Lahore and Karachi, and Dhaka also exhibited protests against Ayub Khan. Besides massive support for Fatima Jinnah against Ayub Khan during the Presidential elections, he was claimed to be victorious by getting 64% votes while, the international media declared the respective election against international democratic standards (Tudor, 2013: 215-220; Shah, 2014: 72-93; Jaffrelot, 2016: 269-277).

As this election resulted in political chaos, particularly in East Pakistan where Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman was demanding maximum autonomy under his Six Points formula. This situation divided the elite and non-elite segments of East and West Pakistan more than previously. The ruling elites of West Pakistan were blaming the political elite of East Pakistan as traitors while politicians of East Pakistan blamed military leadership as well as politicians of Punjab as the exploiters of their fundamental rights. When Ayub Khan could not handle the mass movement he resigned and handed over the power to General Yahya Khan (Hasina, 2019: 119-124).

After assuming power, Yahya Khan announced the Legal Framework Order (LFO) that led to the restoration of the provincial structure by merging princely states into the provinces (excluded states of Hunza and Nagar) and called the first general elections in the country. Elite and non-elite segments of both wings welcomed this decision and started their campaigns. As Awami League contested this election on the bases of Six Points while, Pakistan Peoples’ Party initiated its campaign within the framework of Islamic Socialism (interpreted by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto); both parties got 160/300 and 81/300 seats.
in National Assembly respectively (Hasina, 2019: 124-125).

Post-election 1970 situation even proved worse as a dispute erupted between the top leadership of PPP the largest part of Punjab and Sind and, the Awami League which secured an absolute majority in the Eastern wing of Pakistan. Usually, elections bring harmony and consensus in a democratic setup, but the political elites of Pakistan were not in a compromising mood which resulted in the disintegration of the country and Bangladesh emerged as a separate country on the earth map (Hasina, 2019: 126-131).

The government of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party established under the premiership of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto formulated a new Constitution of Pakistan in 1973, announced political and economic reforms, and tried to establish Pakistan’s cordial and bilateral relations with other countries but unfortunately could not create political harmony with the elites of political parties in NWFP and Balochistan. Bhutto targeted the provincial governments of NWFP and Balochistan where the National Awami Party and Jamaatul Islam were in coalition with each other. The dictatorial attitude of Mr. Bhutto with the support of feudal elites of Punjab and Sind caused massive agitation against his rule in entire Pakistan and his political rift with the politicians of NWFP and Balochistan led the country towards another third martial law which was imposed by C-in C General Zia-ul-Haq in October 1977. General Zia ul Haq abrogated the Constitution, banned political parties, and introduced his kind of reforms. Although, Zia’s rule facilitated the emergence of new ruling elites on the political spectrum of Pakistan, but his initiative for non-parties elections in 1985 has been considered an attempt to trigger ethnic conflicts in the country (Hussain, 2000: 183-202).

The post-Zia period is considered an era of democratic transition that witnessed the dismissal of four elected governments of PPP and PML. These four elections were held on a party basis, but despite that, no civilian government could complete its five-year term. The concept of cosmopolitanism got strength when Pervez Musharraf announced the devolution of the Power Plan. These local bodies’ elections were on non-party bases (Kamran, 2012: 15-16) and this policy initiative, on one side, generated new political and nonpolitical elites, but on another side, the formation of groups with the representation of each caste, language, and religion/sect regarding contesting elections at the local level. And this practice reduced socio-political and ethnic differences among masses in such a way that each elite leader within the towns, tehsils, and districts to be engaged with other elite and non-elite segments for the survival of his/her political career. According to distinct reports published by UNESCO, this initiative led the complex society of Pakistan towards ensuring cosmopolitanism where not only the illogicalities, paradoxes, and divergences among castes in South Punjab and Sindh were undermined but differences on the bases of tribal histories in Balochistan and NWFP were also dented (Kamran, 2012: 16).

Furthermore, state-centrism within the 17th amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 also ensures cosmopolitanism by reducing provincial autonomy. Center-Punjab tussles during Benazir regimes and center-Sindh wrangles during Nawaz regimes had enthused to engineer such a constitutional draft that could discourage biased provincialism by introducing tight federalism. Moreover, the military establishment also formed a law under the respective constitutional amendment that only a graduate candidate can contest the election for a provincial or national assembly. The prime motive behind establishing the ‘First Graduate Legislature’ was also to install such legislative organs of the state that should have no concern with provincialism, racism, ethnicities, or religiosities but only to work for the solidarity and stability of the state under the strict state-centrism. According to Sumita Kumar (2001), Rathnam Indurthy (2004), Hina Altaf (2019), and Hassan Javid (2019); as the Devolution of Power Plan introduced a new political and nonpolitical elite across the country, the first graduate legislature also ousted several heredity politicians by replacing new ones. And this shift in elite political culture facilitates the promotion of cosmopolitanism more than the initial stage (pre-presidential election phase; from May 01, 1959, to 1964) of launching the system of Basic Democracy by Ayub Khan (Indurthy, 2004; Kumar, 2001; Altaf, 2019; Javid, 2019). However, the connection between elite political culture with cosmopolitanism once again suffered from variations since the general elections in 2008. Therefore, the study now explores whether connectivity between respective patterns remained to exist or gradually weak from 2008 to 2018.

**DEMOCRATIC ELITISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM DURING 2008-2013**

The democratic transition phase of 2008-2013 can be
divided into two sub-phases where the first phase started from the inauguration of PPP’s third government to the end of district governments under the Devolution of Power Plan. Pakistani politics is heavily influenced by the elite and their participation in political processes. So, the dynamics of politics that we have in the country are elitist in nature. Creating equal opportunities for all and making politics an accessible entity for the common man is the need of the hour to get rid of this elite politics. The common man must be enabled to see politics as his career and not as something distant and remote from his reality. For this reason, devolution of power to the local level/governance is crucial. On the other hand, the second sub-phase covers the post-18th amendment period. As the first part of this phase covers a period of democratic transition under the shelter of the 17th amendment along with numerous other ordinances imposed by the presidential office under military patronage, the relationship between elite political culture, and cosmopolitanism was continuously sustained until the reversal of graduation’s condition1, 17th amendment,2 and Devolution of Power Plan 20003. Hence, the study now evaluates the respective era in this regard.

**DEMONSTRATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER THE IMPACTS OF 17TH AMENDMENT AND MUSHARRAF’S PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCES**

Critics trace the results of the general elections in 2008 as the product of reconciliation between President Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party. Although, Pervez Musharraf several times claimed that his favored political party PML(Q) got the highest votes but candidature ratio in the National Assembly was exhibiting the victory of the Pakistan People’s Party as the leading political party in Pakistan. From 2002-2007, this parliament was also the graduate parliament. Therefore, it facilitated the educated class (even numerous educated politicians formerly involved in electoral politics) to represent their constituencies. Moreover, several tehsils and district nazims/mayors (who were graduates) were also participated in this election, and they introduced themselves as the newly emerged political elites (Kamran, 2012: 31-34).

However, the court verdict under Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary abolished the condition of graduation in April 2008, declaring this condition as a violation of fundamental human rights. This verdict motivated heredity conservative or traditional politicians (usually rural feudal elites in South Punjab and Sindh, Sardars/Nawabs, and tribal chiefs in Balochistan, KPK, and tribal areas) to contest byelections (Husain, 2018: 211-219). As newly emerged elites were considered fruitful for cosmopolitanism during the Musharraf regime, and they had acquired a slogan “Pakistan First” or “Sab Se Pehle Pakistan”, this tendency was reversed by the participation of conservative or traditional heredity feudal elites in electoral politics. And they participated on the bases of raising slogans related to language, sect, racism, or provincialism (Husain, 2018: 219-220).

According to Marinos Diamantides and Adam Gearey (2011), the prime motive of raising the slogan of “Pakistan First” was to unite the country to ensure cosmopolitanism in the broader framework of “globalism” rather than to follow orthodox pan-Islamism. Musharraf realized that the national strength was now no more in following religious or sectarian identities rather these were dividing the nation more than the linguistic, cultural, or ethnic differences and people through their representatives can lead the country towards solidarity and stability by only carrying

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1 Pervez Musharraf imposed the condition of graduation of contesting elections either for the national assembly, senate or any provincial assembly by amending article 8 (A) of the Conduct of General Election Order in 2002 as the ‘Chief Executive’s Order no 7 of 2002’. However, Supreme Court under Iftikhar Chaudhary abolished this condition as a clear violation of fundamental human rights in April 2008 (Hameed, 2008).

2 17th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was revered since the signature of President Asif Ali Zardari on the approved draft of 18th amendment at April 19, 2010 (Malik & Rana, 2019).

3 Although, the local government ordinance was expired in 2009, but district governments continued their working till October 06, 2010. As 18th amendment declared that the ‘local government’ is now the subject of provincial governments, Balochistan Assembly was the first to introduce its Local Government Act in 2010. On the other hand, Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assemblies passed their local government acts in 2013. However, critics find lot of similarities among Devolution of Power Plan 2000 and the currently local government acts of KPK and Balochistan (Malik & Rana, 2019).
enlightened modernization within the framework of openness, acceptance of western cultural norms, and revolt against taboos (Diamantides & Gearey, 2011). On the other hand, although Sara Ahmed and Fatima Sajjad (2019) criticized “Pakistan First”, they admit that the concept of enlightened modernization was introduced for decreasing religious/sectarian differences by modernization of clergy (Ahmed & Sajjad, 2019). Because of lawlessness and terrorism, Musharraf planned to restore solidarity and stability in Pakistan by installing patriotic and pragmatic sentiments among the masses. And he assumed the slogan of “Pakistan First” as the tool of undermining all the domestic differences affecting cosmopolitanism in the state (Ahmed & Sajjad, 2019).

After the resignation of Pervez Musharraf, when Asif Ali Zardari took the presidential office, a wave of strict provincialism started across the country. On demanding greater provincial autonomy, all the major political parties in the parliament (including PPP PMLN, and ANP) had been united, and they were seeking constitutional amendments for preserving their cultural, ethnic, and provincial identities. On April 19, 2010, the 18th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was implemented by the signature of President Asif Ali Zardari, and it was the day considering the reemergence of former traditional elitism with boosting strict provincialism and loose federalism. By respective amendment, local governments have also been declared as the provincial subject along with 14 other ministries. However, district governments under the second phase of the Devolution Plan were still working across the country at that time, and newly emerged political elites by this system were following the same ideology as they had been committed to at the time of their oath-taking. According to analysts, the impacts of “Pakistan First” were almost abolished from the political surface of Pakistan on October 06, 2010, when the tenure of district governments was ended (Malik & Rana, 2019). As per the critical analysis of Muhammad Faisal (2013), the 18th amendment is the start of inaugurating a loose federation within an ethnically and culturally diverse society like related to labor by the labor department and industries department by appointing provincial minister(s) for labor and industries.

- Education (including school education, higher education, and special education) became the provincial subject while the Ministry of Education at the federal level was renamed as “Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training”.
- Ministry of Archaeology and Culture was renamed as the “Ministry of Culture” and delivered completely to provinces.
- Ministry of environment was renamed as the "Ministry of Climate Change" while, it is dealing with provinces in their territorial jurisdiction whereas the federal government also looks after environmental affairs within the capital territory along with national administrative areas.
- Ministry of health was renamed as the "Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination", and became the provincial subject.
- Ministry of special initiatives closed down as a federal subject.
- Ministry of labor and manpower was renamed as the "Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis & Human Resource Development". However, it is still a federal subject. In contrast, provinces are authorized to deal with issues.
Pakistan with weak democratic culture (Faisal & Bukhari, 2013).

**POST-18TH AMENDMENT ERA, ELITISM AND, COSMOPOLITANISM**

Post-18th amendment era can further be divided into two tenures, one led by Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani and, the second governed by Raja Pervez Ashraf. However, both premiers faced problems caused by multiple factors and one of them was the role played by the elite class which undermined cosmopolitanism, and state as a whole again experienced polarized politics, distrust over institutions, political participation without populism, the dysfunctionality of parliament regarding legislation in public welfare and dynastic politics. As all the respective experiences are generally considered as the major contributor to problems of democracy within any society, but the study looks at the role of elites in politics in Pakistan after the 18th amendment.

**Yousaf Raza Gillani Regime**

Assessment of correlation between elite political culture and political system since the 18th amendment not only indicates its impact on cosmopolitanism but highlights its role in promoting or demoting liberal democracy in Pakistan. Thus, findings related to the stated problem are presented below:

The dynastic political leadership of PPP, PML (N), and ANP (projecting provincialism rather than ensuring state-centrism) claimed themselves to the victorious for the beginning of true parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. However, their ethno-linguistic identities proved the main problems for the democratization process in Pakistan where they claimed their developmental projects as an example of “good governance” separately within their provincial jurisdictions. This was an effort to boost the morale of the masses by offering them more economic opportunities through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and by taking more policy measures. However, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Swat Operation at the national level were the two significant initiatives, at which, PPP was claiming to be the cosmopolitan political party of the federation (Sabharwal & Berman, 2016: 438).

Although military elites have some reservations over provincial autonomy and CPEC projects, Zardari-Kiyani coordination never indicated any major fissure between civil-military leadership (Sabharwal & Berman, 2016: 439). Cosmopolitanism was thought to promote a harmonious relationship between provinces. The theme of cosmopolitanism had been considered as direct proportional to provincialism now where provincial political elites claimed that greater provincial autonomy in the 18th amendment has facilitated all the four provinces to function together within the political structure of Pakistan defined in the Constitution of 1973 (Sabharwal & Berman, 2016: 442). But Supporters of democracy within the civil society had been hopeless because local governments were declared a provincial subject in the 18th amendment (Sabharwal & Berman, 2016: 442).

**Raja Pervaiz Ashraf Regime**

This regime practiced the same attributes as had been exhibited during Gillani-Zardari’s tenure. However, like the Gillani government, this tenure also experienced religious politics of Pakistan Awami Tehreek against federal and provincial governments. However, the state-centric leadership of PMLQ) assisted the PPP government and tackled this matter through negotiations (Chak, 2014: xxii). It was an impact of the AghazHaqooq-e-Balochistan Package that a 2012 survey by Gallup indicated the rising of cosmopolitanism in Balochistan province. As per this survey, 63% of the total Baloch population and 88% of the total Pashtun population of the province showed their commitment and support for Pakistan and this percentage was much high than the Musharraf regime (Chak, 2014, xxii). However, the absence of local governments in this regime created distrust of civil society in provincial assemblies regarding maintaining liberal democratic norms in Pakistan that can only be glorified when a new

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5 Assessment is based upon the survey conducted by the scholar where 15 questions were asked to the interviewees that helps the study to trace out the impacts of elite political culture on liberal democracy in Pakistan (with different aspects).
political elite emerges from the grassroots level (Chak, 2014, p. xxii).

**PML(N) Regime (2013-2018)**

Although, this regime consists of three tenures; Nawaz-Zardari tenure, Nawaz-Mamnoon tenure, and Abbasi-Mamnoon tenure, but political elitism was observed dominant during this period as it had been exhibited during 2008-2013. Throughout Nawaz Sharif’s third tenure from June 05, 2013, to till the presidency of Asif Ali Zardari dated September 09, 2013; the provincial elites of Punjab and Sindh coordinated with each other without projecting any kind of provincialism, political biasness, or parochialism (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235) which facilitated cosmopolitanism, however, during Nawaz-Mamnoon and Abbasi-Mamnoon tenures, study finds some distinct events which are described below;

**Nawaz-Mamnoon Tenure**

Democracy is politics of compromises, but the period of Nawaz-Mamnoon period Polarized the politics and, provincialism was once again triggered and three different parties PPP, PML (N) and PTI were ruling in Sindh, Punjab, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa respectively.

- During the Nawaz regime, the civil-military relationship was apparently in good shape when parliament legislated the National Action Plan and allowed military leadership to initiate Operation Zarbe-Azb across the country. However, few PML(N) leaders criticized National Action Plan because of one of its clauses describing “economic terrorism” as the corruption or misconduct performed by politicians or bureaucracy (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020, pp. 235-252). PML (N) leadership tried to trace military patronage behind PTI 126 days of sit-in in Islamabad against Nawaz Government, which showed mistrust over the army as the state institution (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252).
- This tenure also reflected dynastic politics in entire Pakistan; mainly within the circles of PML(N) and PPP (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252). Although local government elections were conducted under the newly introduced local government acts by the provinces, their legal patterns in Punjab and Sindh had allowed district governments to be the puppets of provincial chief ministers. The absence of direct democracy along with politico-economic autonomy had wiped out the public trust in their representatives but, they were still dependent upon looking the provincial authorities stationed in regional capitals (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252).
- As this regime claimed to be social centrism, the major contribution of this government was to introduce the Protection of Women against Violence Bill 2015 which acquired massive recognition across the country (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252).
- In January 2016, PML(N) tried to ban Tableeghi Jamat in Punjab, which triggered religious politicians against federal and provincial governments. At that time, PML(Q) supported Tableeghi Jamat while JUI(F) remained silent (even following the same religious ideology) because of taking part in the federal government. However, massive protests coerced PML(N) not to do that (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252).
- According to World Bank Group’s president Jim Yong Kim, cosmopolitanism in Pakistan has been widely promoted because of trade liberalization, economic policies, and CPEC projects. Expansion of the roads network in Pakistan not only associated developing areas with developed cities but it contacted provinces by inaugurating new trade hubs (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252).
- However, political elitism was still a major hurdle in sustaining a liberal democratic culture where a cartel of ruling and feudal elites had monopolized local, provincial and federal political systems (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 235-252).

**Abbasi-Mamnoon Tenure**

The disqualification of Nawaz Sharif became the reason for Abbasi’s premiership. However, this tenure did not reflect the anti-establishment campaign. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif and some of his closest ideologists still blaming the military leadership behind the Panama scandal and the Supreme Court’s verdict against Nawaz’s premiership as the biggest support to PTI. However, the cabinet of Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was also reflecting elite political culture within the parliamentary democracy in Pakistan as he always considered himself bound to consult with Nawaz Sharif for each policy initiative (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 252). Moreover, the major achievement of this tenure was the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) reforms bill that availed nationwide recognition, and each political party welcomed this initiative (Mufti, Shafqat, & Siddiqui, 2020: 252).
CONCLUSION
In academic debates, it has been examined that there are several events and legislations within the post-18th amendment political system of Pakistan that facilitated cosmopolitanism even existing alongside polarized politics on the bases of provincialism, somewhat distrust over institutions, blaming dysfunctionality of parliament, and dynastic politics. These are the Aghaaz Haqooqe-Balochistan Package, CPEC, flexibilities for recruitment in armed forces, Swat Operation, National Action Plan, Zarb-e-Azb, Protection of Women against Violence Bill, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Reforms Bill. Nationwide recognition of respective initiatives not only facilitated the promotion of liberal democracy in Pakistan but encouraged political elites to work for public welfare in coordination with other state institutions and related agencies/departments. This coordination would have overcome or resolved the problematics of democracy in Pakistan along with sustaining nationalism and patriotism.

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