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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this study is to investigate why does China adopted the strategy of new regionalism, and is it looking for an era of US decline in the region in the post 9/11 era? Both US and China have made noticeable diplomatic, foreign policy, and cultural advances in their appeal and influence in the region since the 9/11 era. In addition, the Chinese regional integration approach (SCO) with the Central Asian states and Russia and its implication for US geopolitical interest are closely analysed in this paper. It is markedly considered that Beijing has adopted a couple of measures to undermine the US attention in the region, either in the form of a new regionalism policy (SCO), soft power, to the advanced multipolar system, to promote mutual and multifaceted dealings with its bordering countries. The results of this descriptive study indicate that the dynamic role of China has ultimately weakened the emerging role of the US in the region where Washington has already triggered and enhanced its bilateral relations with the Central Asian states. Moreover, this inclusive study examined China’s regionalism approach from distinguishing perspectives such as Economic assistance, oil diplomacy, and economic and political strategies in its rapid ascendance in world politics.

Keywords: China, US, New regionalism, Geopolitics, SCO, Central Asia.

INTRODUCTION

The emerging role of China in the 21st century seems to be challenging the US geo-political dominance across the world, particularly in Central Asia, since 9/11. Due to the war on terror in Afghanistan, the strategic significance of CARs once again caught up the Washington top brass policymakers’ attention to use the Northern supply route for the military operation against Taliban and Al-Qaeda. One of the most dramatic changes in global politics was the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. That dissolution process formed new sovereign states on a world map.

The region of Central Asia has a very influential role in world politics not just because of its vast energy resources but also due to its geostrategic significance for great powers’ influence. China, Russia, and the US are consistently enhancing and promoted their visible and invisible presence in the region since the post 9/11 era (Clarke, 2013). Although Beijing and Moscow tended to pay more attention towards the Central Asian political and economic arena since 1991, like highways, rail lines, air service has been improved and expanded across all five Central Asian Republics Progressively, more new opportunities are opening up for economic, social and
political interaction among the people of Central Asia (Spykman, 2017).

More broadly, the primary aim of Beijing is to promote good relations with neighboring countries, focusing on its border issue, avoidance of conflict, maintenance of peace and prosperity, and even more independently, building socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the same way, the primary concern of the Chinese new regionalism policy towards Central Asia is based primarily on soft power rather than hard one (Kavalski, 2010).

The importance of the region cannot be ignored for several reasons: The importance of the region for China is self-evident. There is consequently a growing literature on regional policies of China, much of which authors review. However, at the outset, it is important to emphasize two puzzles that emerge from a review of the development of regional policies of China. The first puzzle is related to transformation (Li, 2013). The second puzzle is related to China's different policies towards different issue areas and geographical regions. For example, even if we agree that China's policies towards East Asia have generally become more hawkish, why has its policy towards Central Asia remained virtually the same as the pre-2010 era? As we shall see, it makes more sense to talk about policies rather than a policy to describe China's diplomacy. These two puzzles are, in fact, profoundly interconnected and involve trying to identify the forces that drive China's regional policies (Li, 2013).

The study further argues that multiple factors drive China's regional policies. Though China's overall foreign strategy may be the same, pursuing China's "national interests" the way such interests are defined, and the weighting attached to various goals can differ across regions and issue areas (Nathan, 2002). It is why China's regional policies have significant variations and priorities at times, rather than being a single consistent and coherent policy. The study shall suggest that the factors driving such differences may be historical or contemporary, shaped by interests or institutions, and material or conceptual. China's regional policies are the outcome of a complex, changing combination of internal and external forces. As Deng Xiaoping urged, we should seek truth from facts and concretely analyze each specific question. Therefore, the thesis considers China's regional policies in discrete geographical areas, which have specific contingent concerns that influence policy priorities (Li, 2013).

The start of the 1970s began with China's reconciliation aims on the territorial level. With the developed comprehension of its place, China got ready to be occupied with multilateral politics and diplomacy, particularly in the structures where China's power has been perceived. There was a move in China's conduct; Beijing attempted to turn into a capable and helpful accomplice state to invigorate excellent neighborly relations (Wang, 1999).

The participation between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan made another sort of multilateral instrument, "Shanghai Five," that later, in 2001, was changed into the Shanghai Cooperation Association (SCO). As the aftereffect of the fruitful Beijing's international strategy plan, SCO turned into a political gathering for the discourse of territorial security issues (Trofimov, 2002). China's leadership and its energy about the advantages of the multilateral collaboration brought about budgetary help of SCO part states and emotional investment in two-sided ventures. In its turn, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization gave China an entrance to CAR tremendous vitality assets and guarantees for Islamic dissent in the nation's western areas (Foot, 2005). In 1997, by making a functioning stride, China set up geopolitically vassal relations with other states. Clarke portrays present China's international strategy in Central Asia as "new regionalism" – a new security idea for advancing China's "tranquil ascent" China has formed SCO in a remarkable design bearing the engraving of China's international strategy thinking since the mid-1990s (Gubaidullina & Yelibayeva, 2012).

The breakdown of the USSR and the formation of new states have diminished Moscow's impact and opened new doors to China's passionate commitment to the area. The widening of Chinese inclusion in military, financial, social, and political issues exhibit the earnestness of China's endeavors. Russia and China notwithstanding, SCO got another stage for the discourse and sharing interests. It is pointless to disregard the Russian potential and simultaneously to fear the Chinese ascent. There is a gigantic reliance on China's impact on the force and approaches of Russia. Also, impossible to miss China's foreign policy that it is looking for the locales where fewer snags emerge for the extension of China's impact (Barnett, 2001).

SCO is a viable apparatus in China's foreign policy bin.
that structures another kind of communication and level of political reliance. It is the governmental issues of proceeding with the combination of interests that may bring essential qualities. Today, SCO is considered another post out of a shaft of the US that is viable and novel in its temperament. China's new regionalism looks to ensure the local status and advance financial and social improvement. It displays a complex of undertakings for accomplishing a "quiet ascent" to extraordinary force (Yandaş, 2005).

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA:
China-Central Asia interactions have increased since the 1990s. With the increasing energy demands, China has now more interested in the region of Central Asia. After the US, China is the second-largest energy consumer in the world, which has led to competition over energy resources in the world. Presently, China purchases 2/3 of its crude oil from the Middle East. The energy reserves of the Middle East are vulnerable due to military conflicts and terrorism. 80% of the Chinese energy imports are passing through the Strait of Malacca, a region, dominated by the USA, which may threaten Chinese transportation in the area due to the possibility of China-US conflict. As a result, the Malacca Strait is becoming a strategic flaw for China. To overcome the Malacca issue, China is developing its blue water navy capabilities and focusing on constructing pipelines via Pakistan, Iran, and Myanmar from the Central Asian region. China has been in want of expanding its energy supplies and lessening its dependency on the region of the Middle East. In this perspective, energy-rich Central Asia is significant for Chinese oil imports (Mariani, 2013). After independence, China remained to be self-sufficient in energy for several years. However, with economic growth and population, its need for energy supplies enhanced. The demand for oil and gas became more remarkable than the internal production in 1993. Due to this China became dependent on imported oil & gas, and China became the largest energy consumer within two decades. In 2012, China's oil imports reached 66%. The rapid industrial development in China increased the demand for energy (Sepulchre, 2004). Like its contender the US, China has strategic and commercial interests in the region of Central Asia. Primarily, China had a security interest in the region, but with rapid growth in its industrial sector, the oil demand increased. In 2003 China became the second largest oil consumer in the world. China's energy diplomacy acting directly or in coordination with SCO has been successful in establishing firm commercial and diplomatic relations with growing energy suppliers like Kazakhstan. China has made energy cooperation agreements with energy-rich Kazakhstan in order to expand leverage over the energy resources of Central Asian Republics (Gueldry & Liang, 2016).

CHALLENGES TO USA’S HEGEMONIC ROLE IN CENTRAL ASIA
After the cold war, the United States of America has become the sole dominant power in world politics, politically, economically, and militarily. Many scholars and political analysts prognosticated that world politics is shifting from uni-polar to bi-polarity afterward the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The United States of America was the leading country in terms of its vast resources, geography, and a dominant favorable capitalist ideology. The primary player China has frequently adopted a new phenomenon of soft power instead of hard power to challenge US dominance in world politics. Generally, in such a contemporary scenario, the major contestant against the United States is China which is currently establishing a very hard ground for Washington for its assertive competition. China is the only emerging state in the world pursuing the cost imposing strategy against the United States of America. The device of this strategy is based on denying the US military forces bases predominantly in Central Asia, voting against the will of the United States in International institutions on serious issues such as the Veto of Syrian crisis was one of the examples. It has further predicted that under the umbrella of this relevant strategy of new regionalism, it is strikingly opposing the US geopolitical interest in Central Asia. The wide-ranging argument is related to the substantial role of China in the Central Asian region. With the collapse of the USSR, China was the only emerging player who had appeared to confront the US either on the pretext of soft balancing or regionalism strategy. Beijing has slightly enhanced and amplified its share of military strength, economic activities; promote bilateral and multilateral relations against the United States of America (Schweller & Pu, 2011).

To recap, the rise of China in Central Asia, whether in
terms of military, economic, strategic, or cultural, seems to be challenging the US global power. From this standpoint, we can suppose that the system of international world order is returning from a Unipolar to Uni multipolar system where the US influence appears to be declining in Central Asia. However, China’s growing influence in the area will be challenging the international liberal order through its grand strategy of new regionalism (SCO). While analyzing the policy option for the Chinese in the current era, Beijing is more interested in following the discourse of rightful resistance, which they also called the everyday resistance to counter the existing international world order. Thereby “the concept of everyday resistance identifies the prosaic but constant struggle between dominant and subordinate actors that occurs in different social contexts” (Schweller & Pu, 2011).

Even though Beijing is simultaneously confronting and competing with existing orders in different ways, for instance, Beijing is challenging the US global hegemony, especially under soft balancing instead of adopting hardcore initiatives against the US in world politics. While supporting the arguments related to alliances, “In 20th Century, 84 percent of conflicts and wars began when alliances were becoming progressively tense”, these outcomes recommend that China and Russia are playing a predominant role to challenge US hegemony in Central Asia under the alliance of SCO (Hancock & Lobell, 2010).

China’s rise has challenged the US hegemony in the world. In the post-open-up and economic modernization era PR China gained notable economic development. Currently, China’s economy is the second largest in the world, only after the US. In 2010 China became the world’s largest exporter. In 2011, PR China became the first country for incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) and the world’s first investing country for outward FDI among developing nations. China ranked the world’s top trading country in terms of goods, leaving behind the United States (Morrison, 2013).

In the light of power transition theory, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Made in China 2025” are the three more recent challenges for the US hegemonic position. Firstly, the BRI, which has been initiated in 2013 aims to connect China to Asia, Africa Europe and Middle East, and also promote economic collaboration, infrastructure development, global peace, and prosperity. China believes the mega project of BRI will provide benefits to masses around the globe. Currently, the BRI encompasses about 70 countries, accounting for seventy percent of the world’s population and 75 percent of the energy resources of the world (University of Kent, 2019).

**CHINA’S MOVE FROM UNI-POLAR TO THE MULTI-POLAR WORLD AND CENTRAL ASIA**

In the post-cold war era, the United States of America has become the sole superpower in world politics. After the Cold War, the Chinese political and military leaders were more fascinated to follow the pathway toward supportive multipolar systems instead of propagating its economic, political and diplomatic engagement under the sphere influence of the unipolar system. In the post 9/11 scenario, the neo-liberal economic policies of the Western and the United States of America purposely triggered immense tension among the Chinese strategists. On the excuse of war on terror, the US has not only amplified its military, economic and diplomatic influence in Central Asian region but has also deliberately expanded its model for authorization of democracy, freedom of speech to preserve the human rights issue in the less developed region (Clegg, 2010). These sorts of political representations triggered Beijing’s apprehension about the intolerable emerging participation of the US in the region. Besides the preventive strikes, the US twisted the point for China to assume the multipolar approach with Russia to undermine the US geostrategic interest in Central Asia. Beijing has endorsed establishing a multipolar system in international politics, where China has markedly enhanced the notion of Bipolarity towards other emerging players to address the regional, global issues. The Chinese believe that for peaceful and harmonious world politics, Multipolarity is exclusively an “alternative to project for greater global equity...narrowing the scope of US aggression” (Clegg, 2010).

The goal of China’s grand strategy of new regionalism is the quest for targeted interest with its bordering countries of Central Asia. The decision-makers of Beijing do not reinforce its unilateral policies; instead, it is using multilateral mechanisms to facilitate its counterpart’s intentions and interests. From this point of view, its leaders have focused on eye-catching policies rather than following the intimidating ones in international
affairs. While supporting the arguments, China has carried out an inclusive and proactive policy towards Central Asia. One of the Beijing achievements has persuaded the “Asian governments to eschew possible renewed U.S.-blocked pressure or containment against Chin” (Sutter, 2006).

China’s grand regionalism strategy in Central Asia has brought an enormous implication for the US geopolitical interest in the region. Beijing has consciously exercised multilateral relations with dominated countries, including Russia and Kazakhstan, to show its emerging political capability to weaken the US role in the area through the collaboration of its SCO member states. Since the 1990s, China has developed its “New Security Concept,” promoting shared security through mutually beneficial cooperation. Central to this strategy, the SCO is a tool to develop strategic partnerships to counter the US influences. With the formation of SCO, China also depends on its participation in the ASEAN+ forum. The SCO is now becoming a more comprehensive and effective organization, and it reflects China’s goal of promoting wide-ranging strategic partnerships. China is even in favor of a free trade zone covering the SCO area. China is financing infrastructure development to expand trade by a considerable highway along the Silk Road (Carroll, 2011).

UNDERMINING THE US GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IN CENTRAL ASIA

The shifting global policies in the landlocked region due to China’s increasing role in the Central Asian Region have impacts on US geopolitical interests. The increasing volume of China’s strategic responsibility of new regionalism in Central Asia has sped up geopolitical competition between the tilded titans. The US has an interminable intention to maintain its geopolitical influence after withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan. But it seems that the role of the US is deteriorating owing to the lack of any comprehensive strategy for the region (Yu, 2014). The satisfactory role of the Chinese economic expansion in the region cannot be ignored where Beijing has desired intentions that the US must play a secondary role in the region. In contrast, one of the significant implications for the US interest in the area is diversifying energy supply courses for the European Union by China. On the one hand, nearly all European Union states are exporting gas and oil from Central Asia to reduce their energy supply burden. Just in “2010, 88 percent of EU trade with the region came from the oil imports from Kazakhstan” (Yu, 2014).

In a geopolitical context, the Chinese leaders have always favored new security concepts with their neighboring countries to support trade and maintain import and export development in the region to become a rising power globally (Petelin, 2011). There are massive, effective implications for the US geopolitical interest in the region; three components of security positioning of China with Central Asia states are very decisive for its rising status in world politics:

- Central Asia is a buffer zone amongst the great, emerging powers, including Russia, India, Turkey, and the United States.
- The strategic security boundary of Central Asia is incredibly important for Beijing: stability in the region means prosperity, peace, cooperation, and harmony inside its Western parts of China.
- Broader strategic security in the region provides comprehensive advantages for China to set up alliances to challenge the US global hegemony via a new regionalism strategy. SCO is one of the reliable examples of the Chinese strategic initiative in multilateral alliance in the region (Huasheng, 2009). For Beijing, the policymakers should adopt the buffer strategic security positioning options towards the Central Asian States. China can easily boost its political and economic advantages with the collaboration of its counterpart states to weaken the US position in the region. Beijing is trying to deteriorate the “Greater Central Asian Partnership for Co-operation and Development (GCAP)” of the United States of America via its grand strategy of new regionalism. It is another implication for the US geopolitical interest in the region. The driving force behind the plan has links with political and strategic reasons. In contrast, the US is looking for the supports of Central Asia to engage security structures in the region (Kozhokin, 2009).

WEAKENING US STRATEGIC RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA

The US and Central Asian states have signed numerous defense agreements since 2001 to allow the US military bases in the region to drive armed combat against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were critical partners of the Pentagon “Operation Enduring Freedom” to provide strategic military presence inside their territory (Nichol, 2010).
Since 2001 Washington has advanced its military ties with the Central Asian States via different programs such as the “partnership for peace program” (PfP). The US simultaneously promoted its bilateral relationships with Central Asian states, particularly with Kazakhstan, to preclude the propagation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and boost the financial stir up in the region (Rafique, 2002). In 2005 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, the Chinese president’s stance strongly emphasized Presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to sign a declaration about the removal of a security agreement with the United States of America. On account of the Chinese influence over SCO member states, in 2005, the member states declared that ‘so a huge scale military operation against terrorism has come to an end in Afghanistan established a limit for temporary use of infrastructure facilities of the member states of SCO (Nichol, 2010).

Active involvement in the global war on terror, collaboration amongst the “SCO” member states and the US intensely bothered the security environment in Central Asia since 9/11. In the same direction, China’s emerging role since 2001 in Central Asia in the shape of its new regional approach is implicitly undermining the US global role in the region. Under these new strategies, new regionalism approach, and March to the West, China’s global status has been growing and counts as the largest single trading, developing country in world politics (Yandaş, 2005).

CHINA’S ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN CENTRAL ASIA

In Central Asia, China’s strategy can be examined at different levels. This seems to be a continuation of Western China’s development strategy, which aims to among other things to open up Xinjiang and the province’s economic development in order to relieve tensions there. But China is using the same assessment to the Central Asian States, whose economic underdevelopment is cited as one of the reasons for social disorder and the rise of Islamic militancy. Furthermore, this is a relatively new component that Central Asia appears to be both a cross-border market hub for Chinese goods and a source of energy supply that has become increasingly important for China applying (Niquet, 2006).

Therefore, China is encouraging, but with some achievement, the infrastructure expansion to enable business with Central Asian states and the open-up of Xinjiang province. The transportation network, especially the air and road, has been significantly intensified with transgenic Asian highway projects connecting the Andijan region and Kashgar and running through the mighty Karakoram Highway to link and open-up Xinjiang province. The most recent bilateral agreement, signed with Pakistan in 2005, includes extensive work to keep the Karakoram Highway open during all seasons (Wolf, 2021).

From an economic point of view, the goal of supplying energy to more developed and energy-intensive coastal regions of China seemed to have fewer incentives given the rising prices of production and transportation. However, the risks have already transformed for economic motives due to rising oil prices and strategic reasons and strengthening the presence of the US military in the Middle East. China completed 998 kilometers of a pipeline project, connecting the oil fields in Kazakhstan through the Alashan pass with north-eastern Xinjiang; The goal is to expand this network towards Shanghai in eastern China. Although, there is still a long way to fully convert the export networks of Kazakhstan, which are principally oriented towards the Caspian Sea and Russia. However, with the building of this project, PR China is enlarging Kazakhstan’s scope for maneuver and cooperation, thus achieving another partner along US and Russia. On the other side, this project linking China’s Xinjiang province to Turkmenistan has yet to arrive somewhere. Although, apart from these apprehensions, China’s foreign policy towards the Central Asian region has a broader global aspect related to firming the US presence in the region (Peyrouse, Boonstra, & Laruelle, 2012).

CHINESE OIL DIPLOMACY CHALLENGE US INTEREST IN CARS

PR China is currently the world’s major gas and oil retailer and gas overwhelming state in the world. The tremendous importance of natural resources for Beijing is mounting extensively to foster its economic activities worldwide. The significance of Central Asian ordinary possessions after the disintegration of the bipolar system triggered contention amongst China, Russia, and America. Correspondingly, as British geographer Helford Mackinder broadly evaluated the importance of Central Asian geostrategic position and its natural resources (oil, gas, minerals) in his article titled ‘The Geographic Pivot
of History,’ he argued that "in the industrial age, the natural resources of Central Asia—the great pivot—are so vast that it will serve as the geostrategic instruments for the states that control it to become the empire of the world" (Scott & Alcenat, 2008).

The quest for crude oil has generated competition among the great powers in the region, mainly to the collapse of the USSR, where the power vacuum took place in the region. Correspondingly, it was a tremendous global prospect for Beijing to stimulate an ample measure to expand overseas oil supplies of Central Asia to fulfill the gap of its domestic demands. The Chinese perceived that oil is a strategic weapon for its peaceful requirements in world politics. Its worldwide endeavor is to secure the gigantic chunk of natural resources either in Africa, the Middle East, or the Central Asian region. The sheltering and succeeding path of oil diplomacy in Central Asia and China will all means to extricate all available resources of oil & gas undermining the regional and even global order recourse (Lai, 2007).

The Chinese incline to bypass the vulnerable supply routes of the Strait of Malacca. While China's oil diplomacy in the region affects its diplomatic relations in different ways with other nations, especially with the US, such as:

- Beijing is consolidating its mutual dealings through the oil-producing Central Asian States to undermine the US influence in the region.
- China deliberately advocates financial assistance to its neighboring states to divert the oil and gas supply route from West (Europe-Turkey) to East-China.
- For effective oil diplomacy and developing the other alternative oil supply routes, the region of Central Asia appears the best option for China (Lai, 2007).

To summarize, the Chinese grand strategy of New Regionalism (SCO) of Central Asia has brought an incalculable implication for the US geopolitical interest in the region that includes:

- Deteriorating the US global foreign policy approach
- Showing its military ascendancy, for instance, military exercise with SCO member states in August 2014
- Opposing the US liberal democratic concept in Central Asia
- Integrating its strong bilateral relations with Russia and determining the authoritative regime in Central Asia.

PROSPECTS OF CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY OF REGIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

Throughout the past decade, China has strengthened its place as a major actor in Central Asia. China has heavily invested in infrastructure and trade projects to develop regional relations, diversify energy import sources, and protect its western territories. The BRI has become a foundation stone for China's growing power in the Central Asian region. The Corona Virus pandemic revolutionized the economic conditions of many countries, is allowing China to rethink its entire strategy. The post-Covid-19 strategies of PR China for Central Asia need to reflect its capability to move the BRI forward and overcome difficulties that hampered its development in recent times (Zhao, 2021).

In the post-COVID-19 era, China's influence as compared to other powers will only intensify, and no other global or regional power will match China's ability to invest in the South Asian region. Besides no real substitutes to loans from China, Central Asia's dependence will rise. It is necessary to solve the existing problems with anti-China sentiments in the region to take advantage of the situation. Although, anti-Chinese sentiment is on an upsurge in the region, and it is not ending a game. As an initial step forward, China faces the challenge of rethinking its policy in Xinjiang. After two decades of peaceful coexistence with Russia in the region, Beijing finally risks upsetting the balance if its security role in Central Asia continues to grow. But when it comes to history, the two find something in common again (Liu, 2021).

At a time of turmoil in the world economy, China remains one of the few countries that can invest on a large scale. In June 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi acknowledged the negative impact of COVID-19 on many overseas BRI projects and reaffirmed China's status as "major infrastructure projects along the Belt and the road". Reactivate production and supply chains as quickly as possible to create a solid foundation for economic retrieval in all countries (Ye, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The study concluded that Beijing’s role appears very energetic towards the Central Asian States since 9/11 to simultaneously pursue bilateral and multilateral
relations with its counterpart states in the region. Essentially, China observes the US’s declining role in the region after the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. Usually, Beijing is fascinated to promote its financial and administrative inspiration because the Chinese found them as the sole power of the Central Asian Region (CAR) afterward the collapse of the USSR and seeing the “secondary role” of the US. This framework has provided a wide-ranging environment for China to boost its sphere of influence in the region. The position of Beijing in Central Asia has been tremendously growing due to its good neighboring policy for the regional states. Beijing is following the strategies of Deng Xiao-ping, who stressed minimizing the influential role of great powers in the region, especially the US vague role in the region. However, the driving force behind the new regionalism strategy of China is to weaken the dominance of the US, particularly in Central Asia. This means that both tingled titans precisely claim that a prosperous and powerful nation in the world can lead the Central Asian states towards a more robust and more influential region in world politics (Zweig.D., 2010).

The study explored that China is visibly advancing its strategic influence in this region since the creation of SCO in 1996. Frequently, Beijing is heavily investing its cards to become the most reliable state for the Central Asian States to secure its global status and control oil and gas supply routes in the region. To follow the importance of SCO, this is implicitly supporting authoritarian leaders of Central Asia to survive their regime. The Chinese policy toward Central Asia is engaged and to supports Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to counter the emerging role of the US in the region since the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan.

The study also evaluated the phenomena of regionalism discussed with a brief historical background. From Bipolar to multipolar system formation, the importance of regional integration is growing with every passing day. In this context, the ultimate objective of the Chinese new regionalism in Central Asia is unequivocally promoting a peaceful security environment, stirring up economic activities, and hindering border skirmishes among the Central Asian States. Beijing’s top leaders assumed that with the help of a regional integration approach, they could integrate the region more stable and prevent any external threat.

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