




Available Online at ESci Journals

# Journal of South Asian Studies

ISSN: 2307-4000 (Online), 2308-7846 (Print)

<http://www.escijournals.net/JSAS>



## THE ROLE OF CULTURAL DYNAMICS IN THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN

Naseer A. Habib\*

Archive Department of Ahmadiyya Jamat International London, United Kingdom.

### ABSTRACT

The emergence of Pakistan has been the topic of many discussions. An effort has been made to view it through the prism of Oswald Spengler's Cultural theory. Every culture has its own soul, distinctive entity, symbols and dynamics. The Hindus and Muslims belong to different cultures. They have their own past and cultural traditions. After the debacle of 1857, the challenge of British domination created a fissure in their body politic. In this situation, these cultural symbols came to their rescue. The Muslim community of India seems to have been attracted to the symbol of Turkish Khilafat in order to rehabilitate its history in India. But every upheaval that took place in Turkey caused a stir among the Indian Muslims. It evoked unprecedented response among the Indian Muslims. It was the magnetic field of these strong emotions that directed the needle of high politics. In 1924, The Muslims of India lost their important plank when the institution of Khilafat was abolished in Turkey. They replaced it with the idea of an Independent Muslim state. Having accepted it, Jinnah emerged as a symbol of "pious Sultan" for the masses. When Gandhi united the goals of *arhta* and *moksha*, he emerged like *Janaka* for Hindu masses. The Congress could not gauge the depth of the Muslim feelings due to the compulsion of its concept of the essential unity of India. Therefore, the clash of *Janaka* with pious Sultan was inevitable. Herein lies the clue to the emergence of Pakistan. *italics added*).

**Keywords:** Cultural dynamics, Collective memory, Pakistan, Sub-conscious trend, Symbol.

Now almost seventy years have elapsed since the creation of Pakistan, but the historians have disagreed about the emergence of this phenomenon. Various theories have been propounded. Some give more weight to primordial factor and some try to find its clue in the instrumentalist manoeuvring of the imperial power or try to find its clue in the craftsmanship of tiny Muslim elite. Was the creation of Pakistan inevitable or it could have been averted? Islam does not require its follower to form a separate homeland for themselves as a religious obligation. Had it been so the divines of Deoband would not have opted for the Indian National Congress (INC)? Then why was it that westernized Jinnah emerged as a sole spokesman of the Muslim community? The idea of separate homeland gained so much currency and acquired such a momentum that it became impossible to stop it. Anil Seal has highlighted a very important point in this regard. Ideology provides a good tool for fine carving, but it does not make big buildings (Seal, 1973).

\* Corresponding Author:

Email ID: [naseerhabib@yahoo.com](mailto:naseerhabib@yahoo.com)

© 2018 ESci Journals Publishing. All rights reserved.

But if the building materials are there along with the determination of the builder then who can stop the idea to take a material shape. With this key in hand we can solve the riddle which was posted by Choudhry Khaliqzeman, "the history ... of Muslim India is a mass of confusion and a chapter of political benightedness...To try to find any consistency, sound reasoning or logical method in Muslim politics during the period would utterly futile (Khaliqzeman, 1961). We can say there seemed to have been some erratic pattern in the Muslim politics as mentioned by Ayesha Jalal, "There were constant shifts in the communitarian interests depending on a range of temporal and spatial factors (Jalal, 2000). Because most of the time in the idiom of Anil Seal there was no building material to make the building irrespective of the fact that idea was there in a latent form. As the British were thrusting reforms adroitly from the above till war overtook them and things slipped out of their hands. Therefore, once the necessary material was supplied the situation changed thoroughly. If we make the Muslim Community Center of our study, then we can hopefully be able to solve this riddle. It was not

the elite which performed the job of symbols selection it was the Muslim community which responded to these symbols. The concept of Muslim community has a special significance for the Muslims (Watt, 1964). Many symbols were coined and exploited by the elite and many definitions of the Muslim were offered by the Ulama but the Muslim community, responded to those symbols that touched a responsive chord in their bosom and appealed to their collective memory.

#### **BACKGROUND**

In fact, the Muslim community of India has been responsive to the dictates of cultural self. In the beginning, it accepted the slave dynasty by rejecting incapable hereditary rulers in order to survive as a tiny island swathed by Hindu majority. The Ulama and Mushaikh recommended tough measures to deal with the trends of heterogeneity. Even Ulama in their concern to protect the sanctity of faith remained steadfast irrespective of the treatment meted out to them by the Mughal emperors Akbar and Jahangir. Then Shah Wali Allah emerged on the scene as a standard bearer of Islamic cause in the later Mughal period. When he burst on the scene Mughal Empire started crumbling before the challenge of Maratha and Sikh uprisings. Despite the fact Shah Wali Allah embarked upon Puritanical mission in order to purify the society from different type of heresies but he brought forth such a definition of Muslim community which could accommodate different sects and schools of thought especially Shia into the fold of Islam so that a common front may be forged to ward off the danger of political anarchy. Having adopted the tolerant approach, Shah Wali Allah facilitated Shia and Sunni to forge a common front under the banner of Ahmad Shah Abdali at Pani Putt. This type of inclusive-ism was scarcely being offered by the theologians at the time of high noon of Muslim political power as we observe in the case of Mujaddid Alf Thani (Ikram, 1992). But at the time of crisis, again tolerant approach seems to have emerged by the first half of the twentieth century when a particular kind of definition of Muslim community started gaining currency in the Muslim press. Muslim community seems to have extended its arms to embrace all the factions and sects to weather the crisis, shunning all kinds of strict definitions of the Muslim community. Now we look into the matter in detail. No doubt, it was too late to do something when the Muslim middle class rallied under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi, but this venture betrayed the shared concern of the Muslim community of

India. After the debacle of 1857, every section of the Muslim community received a rude shock. In the new system introduced by the imperial power, there was no place not only for the traditional Muslim elite but also for the Ulama. Having established M.A. O College, Sir Syed chalked a plan for the young members of the community according to the requirement of the new system. But "Sayyid Ahmad's religious thought had to be put aside in favour of those held by orthodox Ulama in order to make the college a viable institution. "Aligarh on its own could not generate a sufficiently legitimate set of values. Rather Aligarh served as a modern counterpart of the pious Sultan or in Shah Wali Ullah's terms, the apparent, Zahiri Khilafat, set beside and a Subordinate to hidden Batini Khilafat of the Ulama" (Lelyveld, 1982). Sir Syed in his quest for reformation seemed to have moved from madrasa to mosque and while Deoband strand was determined to move from mosque to madrasa but both had to shun what was incompatible with the disposition of the community. Sir Syed had to forfeit his reformatory adventurism at Aligarh. Aligarh was allowed to bring about rehabilitation in the secular sphere (Lelyveld, 1989). But it does not mean that Sir Syed was given a free hand to deal with the community's affairs. Therefore, when Sir Syed projected Turkey's fate as a non- issue for the Indian Muslims, his arguments fell flat on the Muslim youth who had developed a kind of emotional rapport with Turkey in the historical context created by the writings of Syed Amir Ali, Mawlana Shibli and Abdul Halim Sharar. On this score, Aligarh's offspring joined hands with one section of Deoband which showed its concern for Turkey. What was achieved by Aligarh in a secular realm, Deoband furnished the same in the religious realm in order to meet the needs of the Community. Deoband seemed to have hit the responsive chord with the Muslim community because it made it possible through its creative genius that how the faith should be guarded by self-conscious individual Muslim under foreign rule. As time rolled on this self-awareness of individual Muslim shifted towards their cultural identity and heritage (Gilmartin, 1988). But the Deoband strand had to eat humble pie when it decided to oppose the idea of Pakistan. "The victory for Pakistan represented only a call for a new religious definition of the old rural order, not for a new alignment of political power such as the reformist Ulama had called for (Gilmartin,1979). Despite the fact that the Muslims of India used to lend ear to the call of Deoband, but at this

stage, they preferred westernized Jinnah and his coterie over Deoband strand. Now Jinnah, becoming a symbol of pious Sultan, was trying to attain that empire which was lost in 1857. Our contention is that whenever there was a tension between the local interest and the corporate symbol representing community's corporate interests, the Muslim community of India decided in favour of the latter provided there was a sufficient probability. Smith rightly appreciates, "For no society can survive that does not have some ideal, some faith, and some motivation. If the Islamic were spurned or even allowed to slide, one might reasonably expect either that this would be accompanied by the far-reaching adoption of some other conviction, or else that it would lead to disillusionment and cynicism, and these to disintegration and chaos (Smith, 1957). Rhetoric and mobilization matter but they must rest upon shared experience (Robb, 1991). The factors behind the formation of All India Muslim League was the Muslim community which responded to the call of its leader at different stages of its long journey provided these leaders were able to discern and got themselves harmonized with the urge and the collective demand of the community. But the leaders were discarded by the community if they tried to follow their subjective inclination. Sir Syed was neither a democrat nor was he nationalist, but he served the interest of the community for sometimes. Of course, there were some leaders like Syed Amir Ali who were not convinced with the views of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan but at that time the Muslim community generally did not follow their lead. Aligarh elite carried on his policies until the situation changed by the impact of new events. When the members of the Aligarh elite realized that they could not afford to sit idle relying on the government, they responded to the situation and initiated the process which culminated in the formation of Simla Deputation and the formation of the Muslim League. All India Muslim League (AIML) hit the jackpot when the demand of separate electorates was accepted in the Minto- Morley reforms. Simla Deputation was labelled as a command performance. Awarding the right of separate electorates by the British to the Muslims has been subjecting of much controversy. But it should be born in mind that the British were inclined according to the dictates of expediency and experience to control the communities through the traditional magnets. Given the situation that in a Muslim society political course may be altered by invoking any religious controversy and in this situation, it was more plausible for the British to control

the community by its traditionally accepted leadership. In recent history by declaring Jihad Faraday (a permanent and individual duty), Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Farrag fulfilled the doctrinal need of the Islamist (Roy, 2004). Therefore, it was not the job of Gandhi or Nehru to tell the Muslims that whether India was the abode of peace or abode of war under the British government, the matter which had a political implication. Therefore, the matter was to be decided by the religious clergy and traditional Muslim leadership. The architects of colonial power were also constrained by some political compulsions in managing of the affairs of the empire (Robinson, 1974). In-fact British gave the right of the separate electorate to the Muslims under the compulsion of genuine political needs. It was not sheer benevolence on their part. On the basis of this principle Muslim leader of majority provinces, when came at the helm of the affair, tried to accommodate the Muslim candidates in the jobs and various educational institutions. After the Lucknow Pact, Mian Fuzle Hussain tried to follow this policy in letter and spirit as a minister of education in Punjab. "He ensured a 40 percent reservation of posts for Muslims in such prestigious centres of learning as government college Lahore and Lahore Medical College which had previously been Hindu preserves" (Talbot, 1988). As a result of it, he (Mian Fuzle Hussain) narrowly escaped the no-confidence motion tabled by Hindu members in the Punjab legislative assembly. That is why when Jinnah offered to withdraw the right of separate electorates in 1927 in his Delhi proposals Mian Fuzle Hussain came to the forefront defending the right of separate electorates. No doubt there was much political manoeuvring behind the formation of Simla deputation but if the right of separate electorates had not served the interest of the Muslim community it would have been given up. This was the reason that Jinnah had to include it (the demand of separate electorates) in his fourteen points after being isolated due to his willingness to forgo it in his Delhi proposals. In fact, the Muslim community of India after reeling under the shock of 1857 seems to have taken the right course under the wise leadership of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the founders of Deoband and the Muslims of India started taking solace by connecting themselves with Turkey. By attaching themselves with Turkey they got some compensation for their psychological turmoil in which they had fallen into as a result of their political decline in India. "Islam is not a reified entity...Islam has taken history seriously" (Smith, 1957).

**The symbol of Turkish Khilafat as a Rallying Point:**

Turkey was to them the last of hope of Islam (Qureshi, 1999). To maintain their separate identity and to attach themselves with Turkey were the two oars with which Muslims of India propelled their ship of destiny through the turbulent water of the new world order. As mentioned, "As a symbol of the worldly power of Islam and the seat of its universal Caliphate, Turkey had provided them with a rallying point in British India. She had also given them a feeling of security in the midst of the Hindu majority (Qureshi, 1999). It was the collective genius of the Muslim community which performed the job of symbol selection and whosoever refused to tune with the dynamics of the general will of the community was left behind as a straggler. The Muslim community of India was walking a tightrope. As mentioned by Robinson "The political choices made by the UP Muslim elite were not just constrained by forces within Muslim society; they were also limited by forces playing on it from outside," (Robinson, 2000). "What were these outside forces? Turkey was the last bastion of hope for the Indian Muslim. But the Indian Muslims were confronted with fear that "If Turkey was to disappear they would become like unto Jews – a mere religious sect whose Kingdom was gone" (Qureshi, 1999). Therefore, apart from other factors, it was the context of Balkan wars and fall of Adrianople in April 1913 that provoked an unprecedented reaction among the Muslims as result of Kanpur mosque incident. The whole Muslim press seems to have echoed the same feelings. "In Bengal and the United Provinces, the situation was much the same as in the Punjab...all of which were continuously critical of the government and supportive of the Muslim of Kanpur (Laven, 1974). But the organ of Indian National Congress (The Tribune of Lahore) was not sympathetic with the Muslim cause at Kanpur (Laven, 1974). Interestingly one tri-weekly newspaper of the Ahmadiyya community "Paigham-i- Sulh" published by a group based in Lahore criticised the government for it's not displaying sobriety and statesmanship in handling the situation (Laven, 1974). A general consensus seems to have been reached by the community regarding the political problems. There was very little room for any leader to move away from the main stream. As it is shown by the report of the Honorable Mr J. G. Cumming. C.I.E, "Muhammadan leaders are at present much more numerous than formerly and possess more education and greater independence of character. Any leader, who tries to support Government on all occasion, will soon be

discredited..." (Laven,1974). Having observed the Pan Islamic surge in the Muslim youth, the government refused to grant the charter for establishing the Muslim university (Muhammad, 2002). In this context Young Party started replacing the Old Party whose "slavish reliance on government had never seemed the only way to protect Muslim interests" (Robinson, 1974). Having been disappointed with the government," the Young party men were ready to cooperate with the Hindu nationalists so long as they could protect their identity as Muslims and thereby derive specially agreed upon benefits (Ahmad, 1999). The issue of separate representation had become so important for the Muslims that "No Muslim member of the legislative council could compromise on this issue without jeopardizing his seat at the next election (Ahmad, 1999). In this ethos, the Young party outclassed the Old party and started negotiation with the Congress which culminated in the formation of Lucknow pact in 1916. In this new situation, Jinnah played the leading role. "Lucknow pact has been described as a deal between the Congress and United Provinces Young Party leaders of the Muslim League" (Ahmad, 1999). In fact, Young Party became powerful by responding to the need of the Muslim community. What was the need of the community at that time was described by Syed Ali Nabi, president of the Provincial League, on 19 October 1915, "That in recent years there has never been such a consensus of opinion among all the Musalmans on any political question as there exists today among them on the question of separate representation on local bodies" (Johnson & Seal, 1973). The demand of separate representation had been a basic plank of the Muslim politics since new political discourse developed in the colonial era. The Young party got it approved by the Congress when the government started showing signs of indifference towards the demand of separate representation for the Muslims. In July 1915 the United Province government introduced the Municipalities act but it made no provision for separate representation of the Muslims (Robinson, 1974). Therefore, Young party fulfilled the need of the Muslim community at this stage. Congress was also seeking the cooperation of Muslim League because there were also prospects for new political dispensation and in order to remove the hurdle the cooperation of the Muslims was necessary. In this situation, Jinnah emerged as a prominent leader and dominated the scene. Of course, there were some discordant voices among the Hindus in connection with the concession given to the Muslims in

the Lucknow Pact. As mentioned by Robinson, "Whenever the Congress seemed to come close to the Muslims, there was a Hindu backlash" (Robinson, 2000). It is further explained by Syed Nesar Ahmad, "There were elements among the Hindus, especially the lower middle class that refused to concede to the Muslim demand...these Hindus were suspicious of upper-class professionals and industrialists making a deal with the Muslims, yet they grudgingly went along with the Congress policy of uniting with the Young Muslims" (Ahmad, 1991). With the passage of time these discordant voices became more strident and Jinnah who burst on the scene as a prominent leader among Hindus and Muslims was sidelined on many occasions when he failed to gauge the mood of the community. In order to understand this phenomenon, we have to look into the new developments that were taking place in the political arena. When Jinnah entered into the vortex of politics, leaders of the Muslim community had already adopted separate political course for themselves. The demand of separate electorate was the cynosure of their eyes. Jinnah tried to wean them away from it (Zakariya, 2004). But later he realized its importance for the Muslims and having worked for it, he got it approved from the Congress at Lucknow. It was his great achievement that even pro-Hindu Tilak gave his consent for this pact. However, Jinnah could not assess the depth and the intensity of Pan Islamic surge during the Khilafat movement. Having understood the importance of Pan Islamic feelings for the Muslims, Gandhi offered his cooperation with them and dominated the scene. At that time Jinnah was overshadowed due to his peculiar approach. In fact, Pan Islamism had its roots in history. It survived as a social-cultural sentiment" (Qureshi, 1999). No doubt Mughal refused to accept the Ottoman claim to universal Khilafat but when the Mughal Empire started tottering, the name of Ottoman Sultan as Amir al-Muminin started creeping in the books of the divines, (Qureshi, 1999). After the debacle of 1857, accepting Ottoman Sultan as Khilafa and taking his empire as a vestige of Muslim glory become a source of comfort to the Muslim community. "In this belief, they found some degree of consolation for their own loss of power and prestige in India" (OZCAN, 1997). It was one of the two planks on which the Muslims of India erected the building of their future political discourse. They considered Sultan of Turkey invincible. Their notion about the invincibility of Turkey received a rude shock when Russo-Turkish war broke out in 1877. They became worried and "their

concern was manifested in two respects; (A) The establishment of a large number of organizations to raise subscriptions and the opening of relief funds; (B) Resolutions were drawn up appealing to the Queen and the British government to defend the Ottomans" (Ozcan, 1997). It was this common concern which motivated Shia to join the Sunni in supporting Turkey and united the Muslims of India to raise their voice in favour of Turkey. It was due to the interest of common Muslim in the fate of Turkey which promoted the flourishing of the Muslim newspapers (Ozcan, 1997). After the Russo-Turkish crisis the Muslim society of India assumed a definite political role. It had discovered its identity through Pan Islamism (Qureshi, 1999). During this Russo-Turkish war that heroic resistance offered by Ottomans soldiers under Osman Pasha during the siege of Pleven captured the imagination of every Muslim in India (Ozcan, 1997). When Ottoman army finally collapsed Indian Muslims became so disparate that Lytton warned the British government that if Muslims became convinced that England was helping Russia then the possible consequences might be, "we should not only have to reckon on a real Jihad all around our frontiers, but in every Anglo-Indian home there would be a traitor, a foe, and possibly be an assassin. Such a danger might possibly be more difficult to deal with than the muting" (Ozcan, 1997). "It was this ... prospect' of the Pan Islamic movement in India that, among other factors, induced, the moderates like Mohsin-ul-Mulk and the Aga Khan to agree to the formation of All-India Muslim League in December, in order that they might bring their co-religionists to a united political platform and thus channel their anti-British feelings" (Rahman, 1970). Therefore, it was not the high politics alone and the string of instrumentalists which directed the Muslim elite towards the formation of Muslim League but pressure from the below which culminated in the formation of Muslim political party. In fact, it was the magnetic field of strong Pan Islamic emotions which directed the course of high politics in certain directions. That is why Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Alama Iqbal came from different family background and educational ethos but they shared Pan Islamist sentiment as a predominant feature of their thought and struggle. Here we would like to quote an extract from the book of Manazir Ahsan Gilani who was a student at Tank (a town in Rajputana) when Tripoli was attacked by Italy. According to him, "In the meantime flame of war in Tripoli went up ...in the whole Islamic world including India everyone became confused

and meetings were being arranged in every city and every town and a large number of donations were offered. The number of Urdu newspapers issued weekly went on increasing as a result of this disaster. The demand for news also increased. Newspapers, appeared as a single sided or double sided sheet of paper in the beginning, reached new heights. By the time the Muslim part of the remote town of Tank also became impressed naturally as a result of this catastrophe inflicted upon the Muslim world. (in this context) ...A Nadwi Maulavi (cleric) used to appeal for the help of Turkey at Jamia mosque after Friday prayer... At his chiding that madrasa students were not supporting him... I kept thinking to myself for one week then I made up my mind to address the gathering after Friday prayer... suddenly I stood up and started addressing the gathering in a voice of thunder reciting the verse of the Holy Quran "Separate yourselves from the righteous this day, O ye guilty ones," (Chapter 36: verse 59) ...every one became stunned... in fifteen minutes the whole crowd stood weeping... people were offering their watches, coats, sticks, rupees and rings, whatever they had, in donation... I became the preacher of the whole city. From this insignificant and poor town, twenty thousand rupees were sent to Turkey (Gilani, 1416 Hijra [1995])." In this situation the youth like Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Ulama like Abdul Bari whom capitalist system failed to absorb or made redundant were attracted towards this phenomenon in order to make themselves felt. Leaders who were well entrenched in the system like Raja Sahib of Mehmudabad and Pirs of Sind (Ansari, 1992) were bound to move by the current of the time but could not go far due to their peculiar compulsions. But the case of Jinnah was different. Having been convinced with the tradition of justice and fair play of the British people, he believed in the constitutional method. Jinnah could not understand the intensity of the trauma through which Muslim community was passing through at that time. According to the words of Cantwell Smith, "The fundamental spiritual crisis of Islam... stems from an awareness that something is awry between the religion which God has appointed and the historical development in the world which He controls" (Smith, 1957). In the Quran it is declared "You are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind (Chapter 3, verse 110)" But they awoke to "the realization that the encroachment of the west was an experience being shared by almost all Muslims" (Robinson, 1993). One after and another all the Muslim countries were encroached by the western power. Thus,

Turkey was to the last hope of Islam (Qureshi, 1999). A fear had haunted the Indian Muslims if Turkey was to disappear they would become like unto Jews - a mere religious sect whose Kingdom had gone" (Qureshi, 1999). When this fear appeared to become a reality at the end of the war in 1918, naturally this evoked tremendous reaction among the Indian Muslims. When All India Muslim conference was held at Lucknow on 21 September 1919 it was reported, "Many among the audience literally wept and loud sobs were heard when Sulaiman Nadwi said that they had gathered to mourn the demise of Islamic grandeur and power and to carry its dead body to the grave, (Qureshi, 1999). It was not possible for any leader to stand before such a strong torrent of passions. Jinnah made the mistake to challenge the storm and had to leave the stage at Nagpur Congress session on December 1920. Gandhi did not help him, and he had to step down from the platform. His comeback became possible only when he harped on the same tune which was demanded by the community. Now we look into the matter. The Muslim community of Indo-Pak subcontinent had been cautious to protect itself and in this struggle for existence it seems to have shifted its rallying point. Facing the Maratha challenge When Shah Wali Allah became disappointed with the local leadership he started looking towards Ahmad Shah Abdali outside India to find a rallying point. In the same way after the debacle of 1857 the Muslim community was adrift, and the Muslims were in search of rallying point. "The Muslims of India, in their quest for rallying point, reached out to Turkey and having created an aura of grandeur around the concept Ottoman Caliph they found some solace. But then this tide started receding. "The treaty of Lausanne was a turning point in the Khilafat movement. It marked beginning of the end...until the abolition of Caliphate by Ankara in March 1924 took the wind out of its sails" (Qureshi, 1999). From the point of view of the Indian Khilafatists it was certain that one great plank in their programme had rotted away. The contemptuous indifference shown by Turks had dampened their enthusiasm for Turkey" (Qureshi, 1999). For the time being, Muhammad Ali tried to hold fast to his vision of Pan-Islam...His efforts failed, and like the other disappointed and disillusioned Indian Muslims, he had to turn his attention to affairs within the country (Ikram, 1992).

**Strengthening of separatism among the Indian Muslims:** The course of event forced the leaders and the Indian Muslims alike to change the focus of their

attention. With this shift, moribund Muslim League received a whiff of fresh air and started showing the sign of recovery. Having lost its one basic plank, The Muslims of India painfully realized that their sacrifices and emotions were ruthlessly disregarded by the Turkish leadership while abolishing the institution of Khilafat for the benefit of the Turkish nation. Therefore, Muslims of India were bound to look inward in order to shape their destiny and to gain leverage in India. This process helped open the way to Muslim separatism in India in due course of time. This process started gathering momentum slowly. Whether it was Muslim elite who consciously selected divisive symbols instead of composite symbols to gain political power or the Muslim elite was not free enough to perform this job is a moot point (Robinson, 2003). Was the issue of Khilafat a doctrinal issue rooted in religion? Had it been so the Muslim community could not move forward after the abolition the institution of Khalifat which, according to them, was essential to Islam (Ikram, 1992). It means despite the fact that Islam was not an epiphenomenon for the Indian Muslims, but they showed dynamism and pragmatism in interpreting Islam. We observe its signs in the efforts of Iqbal. According to Iqbal, "The...question ...is this – should the caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey's Ijtihad is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly –personally, I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound" (Iqbal, 1963). In this way, Muslim community accepted the lead of those ideologues that showed pragmatism and realism without devaluing the cosmopolitan aspect of the Islamic faith. Iqbal suggested, "Indian Muslims...should sink in their own deeper self like other Muslim nations of Asia, in order to gather up their scattered sources of life and... stand on their own legs" (Ikram, 1992). Having remained attached to their identity and heritage, The Muslims of India showed dynamism in adjusting themselves to the new changes. Now we look into the matter what were the causes that led them to separatism. After the First World War new changes were taking place in the structure of the World economy. As a result of its process of industrialization speeded up in India. New elite emerged on the scene. The new emerging bourgeoisie elite had the capital but there were laws not conducive for the investment of this capital. Therefore, nationalism was encouraged to get the laws softened by putting the pressure on the British (Ahmad, 1991). The new bourgeoisie elite supported Gandhi to mobilize the whole

country. Therefore, Gandhi extended the hand of friendship towards the Muslims by supporting their Khilafat cause. But in this venture, he included in his programme, "the elite consisting of both the professional and trading classes and incipient industrial class (which)... was highly communal in its outlook...Gandhi tried successfully to incorporate the communal religious outlook within the nationalist movement" (Ahmad, 1991). Therefore, communal differences toned up by the economic inequalities remained there unaddressed and were bound to come to the surface when the spell of enchantment was broken by the inherent disharmony of this superficial national unity. "Between 1916 and 1922 many of the developments in Indian politics went against Jinnah's grain" (Jalal, 1985). With the ascendancy of Gandhi, the politics of the Congress changed from a clubroom affair to a mass movement (Robinson, 2003). Gandhi provided the basis for new political discourse from the spiritual heritage of India. He became disillusioned with the West. On the basis of his spiritual vision, Gandhi united all sections of the Hindu society. After Tilak, he was the first Indian politician who proudly asserted the cultural lore of Hinduism and inspired the masses (Wolpert, 2001). In this way, he built a bridge between the western elite and the masses. For the masses, Gandhi was like a Janaka, King of Videha, who united the goals of both Artha and Moskha. In this way, Gandhi infused the integrity into the Hindu society which had been fragmented due to the challenge of the new ethos of colonialism. He even included the Muslims in his programme by supporting the cause of Khilafat. Emerging Hindu bourgeoisie elite supported this unity in order to extract some concessions from the British. Jinnah was made of different stuff. From his particular bend of mind to his personal attire he was inspired by the British value system. He could inspire Montague, but he could not communicate with the masses with his western outlook and refined taste. Despite the fact, he tried, again and again, to enter into the new dynamics, but he could not catch up with it. In fact, the Muslim League had not reached that destination which was achieved by the Congress in 1920 (Robinson, 2003). When Gandhi widened the base of the Congress, the centre of gravity was shifted towards masses and we are rightly informed that, "The untold story lies in the dusty lanes and by-lanes of town and cities ...in and around the bustling vernacular newspaper offices, district courts, Thanas, and municipalities or in the seemingly benign madrasa

Pathshalas, Mosques, Temples and Sufi Shrines, the focal point of mobilization in Sind and Punjab" (Ansari, 1992). In this area refined politics of Ferozshahmehta and Jinnah's constitutional skill became irrelevant. Gandhi exploited the Hindu symbolism and traditional belief with reference to the realities of the time and needs. Gandhi had weathered his mental and spiritual crisis by dint of his personal experience and he wanted everyone to apply this formula confronting with political, social, and economic problems. By blending the religious symbolism with the current problem of the time he struck the chord in the bosom and received a tremendous response. This response encouraged Gandhi very much. It was not the demise of Tilak and Gokhale that gave free hand to Gandhi but his genius with which he blended religion into strong socio-political movement by giving the real meaning to the political struggle of the masses. With this development, Jinnah's era came to an end. Jinnah was a different type of man. He was inspired by the west and he solved all his problem by following the set of values introduced by the West. "He was the product of a liberal, cosmopolitan atmosphere" (Ikram, 1992)." But "This fusion of religion and politics had left Jinnah cold in the wings, (Jalal,1985)." Now the battle was going to be fought in the arena shared by the masses and the lower middle classes instead of clubroom's recesses which was in the reach of a small minority. With the widening of the base of Politics, Jinnah became irrelevant. He tried, again and again, to come back but in vain. In 1921 he tried hard to persuade Gandhi to accept the offer of negotiation propounded by Lord Reading, but Gandhi refused. Had that offer been accepted there would have been chance of Jinnah's come back. But by rejecting these offer Gandhi foiled the efforts of Jinnah's return. Congress had reached a stage and the Muslim League was on its way. Having been disappointed in the Congress, Jinnah tried to gain influence in the Muslim League. Now we look into this matter how he emerged as a sole spokesman from the position of isolation. Having lost one of its plank (institution of Khilafat) Muslim communities started looking inward in order to preserve its identity. In fact, the motives for the self-preservation of the Muslim community of India had always been there. "The Khilafat movement... was not just an adventure in altruism or merely the concomitant of romanticism...they were pursuing the salvation of Muslim sovereignty and power abroad and with it the security of the Muslim community in India" (Qureshi, 1999). After the collapse of the Khilafat

movement Muslim community shifted the focus of attention towards Indian affairs in order to gain strength inside India. The sign of this trend seems to have emerged on the scene when the Muslim League session was held in Lahore in 1924. "This session passed a comprehensive resolution on Muslim demands which marked a far-reaching change in the political goal of Muslims India. Hitherto, all emphasis was on providing safeguards or weight for Muslim minorities. Now a provision was made that the adequate and effectual representation to minorities would be subject to the essential proviso that no majority should be reduced to a minority or even equality. This was to ensure that Muslim majorities should remain unaffected in Muslim majority areas" (Ikram, 1992). MianFazl-i-Husain was working behind the scene as the moving spirit (Ikram, 1992). It means the centre of gravity and initiative had shifted towards the Muslim majority area. From now the Muslim League was on the way to get more concessions than what had been given in the Lucknow Pact. But the Hindu Mahasabha did not allow the Congress to reach an agreement on this point. Jinnah was trying to make another agreement between the Muslim League and the Congress similar to the Lucknow Pact and he presented Delhi proposals in a convention called by the Muslim League on March 20, 1927, under which Muslim would give up the separate electorate and accept general electorate with certain conditions (Zakiria, 2004).

**The right-wing Hindu Mahasab and the Indian National Congress:** The Congress endorsed Delhi proposals and passed two resolutions in favour of Proposals in May 1927 and December 1927 (Hamid, 1971). But at this stage politics had taken a different turn and become culturalized. Jinnah and the moderate congress leadership both received a backlash. As it is mentioned by Rafiq Zakaria regarding Delhi proposals, "No prudent Hindu, having the larger interest of the country at heart, could object to it, but what thwarted Jinnah's desperate effort to win over the Hindus was the strong opposition that those proposals evoked from a number of Muslim leaders who were not prepared to give up separate electorate under any circumstances. This considerably weakened Jinnah's bargaining position" (Zakaria, 2004). No doubt the opposition launched against Jinnah by Shafi League weakened his bargaining position but why did prudent Hindu leaders not strengthen Jinnah's hand in the best interest of the country? Because the situation had changed and there



were appearing new forces on the horizon creating fear and doubt in the mind of the prudent leaders. "This was Motilal's fear. So, in his letter of 2 December 1926 to his son, Motilal had added, "Malaviya - Lala gang aided by Birla's money are making frantic efforts to capture the Congress ...they will probably succeed as no counter effort is possible from our side" (Ghose, 1993). Despite the fact that Malaviya - Lala gang could not get hold of the Congress eventually but Motilal Nehru knew his limitations very well as he mentioned in his letter, "I have been fully denounced as beef - eater and destroyer of cows, an opponent of prohibition, of music before mosque... I could only contradict this in public meetings, but they permeated hamlets and villages which I could not reach, (Gould, 2004)." As a result of it "The elections of 1926 were fought on national versus communal basis and Mahasabha captured Hindu votes" (Gilmartin, 2000). And every Hindu Congress candidate was defeated; Pandit Motilal survived due to the courtesy of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. The leaders of Congress became scared. They were bound to discipline themselves to avoid a further rout. Therefore, despite the fact that "Jinnah staked his whole political career... The Congress first accepted moderate Muslim demands but Motilal Nehru as its president backed out under pressure from the Hindu Mahasabha" (Zakaria, 2004). From 1923 the Arya Samaj had reintroduced its campaign of Shuddhi: religion had not only re-entered politics but was helping in the redefinition of Hindu society. The elections of 1926 in UP were marked by direct appeals to communal identity, spearheaded by a rejuvenated Hindu Mahasabha" (Gould, 2004). Jinnah proposed four amendments to the Nehru report. The proposed amendments were not unreasonable or eccentric. These amendments were founded on his Delhi proposals and the Congress had already endorsed them in May 1927. The Congress practically had no prejudice against those amendments "yet it feared a Hindu backlash" (Gandhi, 2000). The Congress leaders succumbed to pressure exerted by the Hindu Mahasabha. But the matter was not so simple, and it was not a freak of chance. It was the outcome of certain dynamics rooted in the depth of their cultural differences which became sharpened due to the economic inequalities. We look into the matter in detail. The advent of the British rule in India took the Hindu and the Muslim intelligentsia by surprise and they went into a state of shock. Raja Ram Mohan Roy in Hindus and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in Muslims emerged as apologetics to

reconcile the society according to the dictates of Western bourgeoisie vision (Reetz, 1980). The interest which European scholars displayed in the study of classical Indian philosophy and Sanskrit, helped the Hindus to develop their self-consciousness" (Schimmel, 1963). Slowly the intelligentsia of both the communities seem to have regained their self-confidence and started feeling proud regarding their spiritual heritage. Rabindranath Tagore, Rama Krishna, Aurobindo Ghose emerged as living symbols of mother India (Schimmel, 1963). They brought back their westernized youth to the sources of their culture. Tilak and Gandhi infused these spiritual notions into the political dynamics of India. And the response they received from the masses gave them the confidence to remain attached to this approach and policy. And the leaders who did not follow their line of action went into shade. The same changes seem to have taken place among the Muslims. "The Indian Muslims did not fail to recognize the achievements of their Hindu countrymen and also witnessed the predilection of the West for Hindu and Buddhist thought as opposed to Islamic thought" (Schimmel, 1963). There emerged among the Muslims many leaders and ideologues who wanted to address their political problems by linking themselves with their own past and sources of their culture. Mawlana Shibli, Abul Kalam Azad, Mawlana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Alama Iqbal were among them. Iqbal who burst on the scene as a nationalist, after returning from Europe seems to have taken a pragmatic view. In 1909 he wrote, "I think that the preservation of their separate national entities is desirable for both the Hindus and the Muslims. The vision of a common nationhood for India is a beautiful ideal... but looking to the present conditions and unconscious trends of the two communities appears incapable of fulfilment" (Ikram, 1992). Later this unconscious trend mentioned by Iqbal dominated the scene. In fact, this unconscious trend got new impetus when diarchy was introduced in 1921. Sir Fazil-i- Hussain tried to ...secure for The Muslims the same share in the services which was allowed to them, under Lucknow pact (Ikram, 1992). The leaders of Hindu Mahasabha considering this policy an attack on their long-held superior positions in education, health, local government and administrative departments (Abid, 2008). They girded up their loins to counter this move. Motilal Nehru and Jinnah stood to arrest this process.

**The Indian National Congress succumbed to the pressure of Hindu Mahasabha:** In 1927 Motilal Nehru

offered that if Muslim gave up separate electorates he could persuade the Indian National Congress (INC) to accept other Muslims demand” s (Shahid, 2007). Jinnah welcomed this offer and presented Delhi proposals. “All India Congress working committee (AICC) at its meeting in New Delhi on 21 March 1927 recorded its satisfaction on the Muslim proposals... The Hindu Mahasabha challenged the representative character of the INC and stressed that only the Hindu Mahasabha was the proper body to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the Hindu community with any Muslim organization” (Shahid, 2007). The same reaction seems to have come from the Muslim leaders. By the middle of May 1927, the Muslims of Madras, UP, the Punjab, Bengal and Bihar had condemned joint electorates (Shahid, 2007). Under these circumstances, Motilal Nehru prepared Nehru report and Jinnah suggested 4 amendments to it. Both had become aware of their limitations. Both tried to grapple with the dynamics of cultural differences but pull of this unconscious trend (in the idiom of Iqbal) was so overwhelming that they had to give up their idealism. Jinnah went back quickly and in his fourteen points once again tried to adjust the demand of separate electorates. With the introduction of a system of diarchy, the centre of gravity shifted towards provinces. And provincial leaders emerged as main actors. Fazli Hussain dominated the scene. It was Fazli-i- Hussain who became the cynosure of all Muslim eyes and he was behind the creation of Shafi League. And he formed the Muslim delegation for Round Table conference. Fazli Hussain tried his best that the Muslim delegation should submit its case unanimously. When the government seemed to have bowed down before Gandhi’s pressure to include nationalist Dr Ansari as a Muslim representative Fazli Hussain told the viceroy that if Dr Ansari was included as Muslim representative then Muslim delegation would resign en bloc and return to India (Batalvi, 1978). Therefore, viceroy could not oblige Gandhi. The same strict stance seemed to have been taken by Jinnah at Simla conference in 1945 when he rejected the viceroy’s offer that four members for the Executive council would be proposed by the Muslim League, but the fifth place would have to be given to a non- League Panjabi Muslim (Qureshi, 1987). Therefore, we can find out some sort of consistency in the seemingly erratic pattern of Muslim politics in India. No doubt sometimes this central theme put on the back burner due to peculiar circumstances. For the time being, leaders who were interested in central assembly’s politics went

into the shade as the centre of gravity was shifted towards provinces. Another important leader who emerged among the Muslims was Iqbal. Although he was a poet, he had a vision. Iqbal must have been aware with the dynamics of cultural difference and be member of the Punjab legislative assembly had closely watched that “how the Hindus and the Muslim distrusted each other, and were ranged in opposite hostile camps, kept from a bitter civil war only by the strong hand of the British army (Ikram, 1992). Thus, he came forward and set before the Indian Muslims, the national goal of what later came to be known as Pakistan (Ikram,1992), while addressing at the annual meeting of All India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930. Muslim intelligentsia started taking this problem in term of the separate national entity. No doubt, Allahabad session of Muslim League was poorly attended, and administrator of this meeting managed with difficulty to meet the quorum requirement. But how this little ravine turned into a roaring river? It was due to this fact towards which Robison refers, “Congress had its own ideological position which limited its capacity to deal effectively with the League” (Robinson, 2003). The more congress laid stress on the essential unity of India the more the Muslims of India rallied under the banner of the Muslim League leaving aside all kind of their internal differences. Perhaps Hindu Muslim problem in India was summarized best by De Valera, who was in power in Ireland in 1932. Talking with A. S. Iyengar, he said, “I am trying to understand your Indian problems since 1919, but the more I try to understand them the more complex do I find them. They are not the problems of the country, but of a continent...you have the same differences that more or less divide us between Ireland. There you have the Hindu Muslim. Here we have the Protestant-Catholic” (Iyengar, 2001). Later the same reality dawned upon Jinnah when he came to attend the Round Table Conference. The Congress remained absent from the first session of the Round Table Conference and gave an ultimatum that unless the Nehru Report was enforced in its entirety as the constitution of India it would have nothing to do with further constitutional discussion (Qureshi, 1987). It means that instead of addressing the Muslim problem the Congress (INC) was inclined to ignore it. Even when Gandhi participated as the sole representative of Congress he was not ready to accept “the continuation system of separate electorates in the legislative bodies in India” (Wilcox & Embree, 2004). Apart from that Mr Gandhi required of Muslim delegation

in support of a common cause that “Muslim delegation should oppose any special arrangements or safeguards being provided in the constitution for the depressed classes” (Wilcox & Embree, 2004). Muslim delegation could not take up this position, therefore, the agreement could not be reached. At that time the Congress negotiation positions had become limited due to its “nationalist vision of the fundamental unity of India” (Robinson, 2003). On the other hand, Muslims were not ready to give up their demand for a separate identity. Jinnah was still vacillating and was looked with suspicion by Fazl-i-Hussain and other Muslim leaders. Jinnah decided to settle down in England. Jinnah laid bare his heart before Sheikh Ikram during the course of a visit to Oxford in 1932, “The Hindus are...incurable. The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people...where is, between these two groups, any place for a man like me?” (Ikram, 1992). But the study of H. C. Armstrong’s “Grey Wolf” showed him the way. Jinnah was a man of committees and conference rooms as a good negotiator.

**Jinnah became attuned to the demands of the Muslim community:** Politics of the country had moved away from the conference room and the negotiating table. Now putting all kind of his idealism on the back burner, Jinnah decided to bring the incorrigible Hindus around. After that, he never took the risk of challenging the will of the community by compromising over separate electorates. The more he got himself attuned with the general consensus of the community the more he became relevant. At that time having been discouraged by the Khilafat experience the Muslim community seems to have developed consensus to protect the separate Muslim Identity. It is interesting to note that even the members of Ahmadiyya community became involved and tried to persuade Jinnah to play his political role and, in this connection, Imam of Ahmadiyya mosque London Mr A.R. Dard met Jinnah at his office King’s Bench Walu London on March 1933 (Shahid, 2007). “Jinnah agreed with him and visited London mosque and spoke to a large gathering. Mr Jinnah opened his address with these words,” The eloquent persuasions of the Imam left me no way to escape (The Sunday Times, 1933). He further spoke on India’s future.... made unfavourable comments on the Indian White Paper from a national point of view. The chairman, Sir Nairn Stewart Sandeman M.P., took up the Churchill attitude on the subject, and this led to heckling by some of the Muslim students, who were, however, eventually calmed by the Imam of the mosque,

(Sunday Times).” Apart from this, Jinnah’s lecture was also reported in other newspapers. Jinnah returned to India and started his struggle. This time he did not make a mistake by alienating himself from the general consensus of the community. But this time mistake was made by the leaders of Indian national congress (INC) by challenging the separate identity of the Muslim community of India. Now we look into the context in which Congress made a mistake. In fact, the Muslim community was doing struggle for its existence and was in search of a rallying point.

**The Symbol of a separate Muslim state:** This rallying point was finally found in the concept of a separate state for the Muslims of India. In this quest, the Muslim community shunned all kind of sectarian differences. In this connection, an interesting case was of Muhammad Zafrullah Khan who belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect which, according to him, was not very popular with the general run of Muslims (Wilcox & Embree, 2004). When Samuel Hoare secretary of state for India, told Zafrullah Khan that they were considering his appointment as a member of Viceroy’s executive council, Zafrullah Khan warned Samuel Hoare, “I must warn you that I belong to a particular religious movement in Islam which is not very popular with the general run of Muslims on account of differences of doctrine” (Wilcox & Embree, 2004). Zafrullah Khan’s apprehensions were not totally unfounded. As soon as Maulana Zafar Ali Khan got wind of it he promptly wrote a letter to Samuel Hoare on behalf of Indian Muslims and published it in his newspaper Zamindar on 26 August 1934 expressing his concern about the proposed appointment of Zafrullah Khan (Shahid, 2007). But at that time Muslim community of India was passing through a critical phase and therefore it could not afford such a sectarian approach to be followed. Therefore, many newspapers condemned Maulana Zafar Ali Khan’s approach (Shahid, 2007). At that time unconscious trend (mentioned By Iqbal in 1909) seems to have dominated the scene and Muslim community was in search of rallying point. In this perspective, Shahidganj mosque incidence took place on 8 July 1935 which seems to have strengthened the view that neither elite nor religious divines were independent in symbol selection. The destruction of the mosque triggered a series of events that culminated in massive demonstrations in Lahore” (Martin, 1988). Majlis Ahrar Islam which emerged on the horizon of Punjab in the 1930s as a force to be reckoned with kept itself aloof from

the incidence and as a result of this tactical blunder faded away (Kashmiri, date not mentioned). Shahidganj mosque movement was a very important event in the history of Indian Muslims. The Shahidganj agitation pointed the way toward the emergence in the 1940s of another symbol of the Muslim community; the concept of the Islamic state of Pakistan" (Gilmartin, 1988). This was an important development. It means that now the right of defining the community was not the prerogative of the canonical Ulama but "the conception of community popularized... not be grounded in any particular of organization or code of conduct, but, rather, in the special inheritance symbolized by the Prophet, the Quran, and the mosque- that every Muslim could claim as his birthright" (Gilmartin, 1988). Ulama could not discern this subtle change and became stragglers. "Now we dilate upon its context to get insight into it properly. When the Act of 1935 came into operation the electorate jumped from seven million to thirty-seven million. It means that the role of the elite became more limited due to the participation of masses. Elections were held in February 1937 and Congress swept the poles in six provinces. This was a strong point for the Congress but became a weak point for it also. As a result of this victory, congress became overconfident. As it is mentioned by Ayshe Jalal, "So there seemed little point in paying much heed to League- an assessment which seemed reasonable enough in the first flush of victory in 1937, but one which was to prove to be one of the gravest miscalculations by the Congress leadership in its long history" (Jalal, 1985). The Muslim League (AIML) despite the fact that it did perform well on the Muslim seats in the Hindu majority provinces, but its performance was insignificant in Muslim majority areas. In the Muslim majority areas due to the political manoeuvring of Muslim politicians, the danger of Congress (INC) domination could not be felt. But the Muslim living in Hindu majority area came to realize this danger earlier and they became almost panic when eccentric conditions were offered by the Congress (INC) for the formation of the coalition government in UP. Congress victory blurred the vision of its leadership to gauge the real depth of Muslims feelings. Actually, a storm was brewing inside the Muslim community, but the Congress remained indifferent. Ch. Khaliquzzaman visited AMU to apprise the students of the conditions which were presented by the Congress for the coalition government. Ch. Khaliquzzaman tells, "While reading it I could see the effect on the boys. By the time I had finished,

I felt that I had won the day. The boys took me out of the Hall on their shoulders loudly clapping all the time" (Muhammad, 2002). The Muslims of the minority provinces rallied around Muslim League (AIML) because they started feeling the brunt of the challenge posed by the Congress (INC) before the Muslims of the majority areas could realize it. But the Muslims of the Majority areas could no longer remain indifferent to this challenge.

#### **THE MASS CONTACT MOVEMENT OF THE CONGRESS AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE MUSLIMS**

As soon as Congress (INC) started its mass contact movement the intensity of the challenge was felt by the Muslims of the majority provinces. For example, the Congress decided to field its candidate in the by-elections held in Punjab for the central assembly seat vacated by Khalid Latif Gaba. The Congress fielded Abdul Aziz, unknown but a rich person, as its candidate against Maulana Zafar Ali Khan. But the prominent Muslims of Lahore including Iqbal started exerting pressure on Abdul Aziz to withdraw in favour of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (Batalvi, 1978). Due to this enormous pressure exerted by the community Abdul Aziz had to withdraw. Same kind of episode we observe when Khazar had to tender his resignation on account of the community's pressure. Sir Sikandar Hayat also became worried about the Congress intervention. Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, joint secretary the Punjab Muslim League, writes, "Sikandar Hayat had realized that his Unionist party could not face the onslaught of the Congress... during this fray between Abdul Aziz and Zafar Ali Khan, Sikandar Hayat's messenger visited the Muslim League office, again and again, carrying his message and even Sikandar Hayat did not hesitate to meet with Barkat Ali at this time" (Batalvi, 1978). This was the background of Sikandar Jinnah Pact which enabled the Muslim League to get a foothold in Punjab and to attract youngsters like Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Mian Mumtaz Daultana. In fact, the unscrupulous behaviour of the Congress alarmed the Muslims and they quickly rallied behind Jinnah.

**Jinnah's first March:** Jinnah labelled the Congress as Hindu Party which was determined to eliminate the cultural identity of the Indian Muslims. Having observed the Congress behaviour especially the jingoistic statements issued by Nehru, Jinnah became disappointed with the Congress. Jinnah emerged on the horizon as Mustafa Kamal Pasha to lead the Muslim community confronting with the challenge of the Congress (INC). By 1938 Jinnah was so desperate that he offered to help the

British at the centre if they were ready to protect The Muslims in Congress Provinces (Jalal, 1985). It was totally uncharacteristic of Jinnah. It means Jinnah who once taught young Raja Sahib of Mehmoodabad, "you are an Indian first and then a Muslim," was dead and new Jinnah rose from his ashes. The British, who did not respond to Jinnah's generous offers for cooperation in 1938, turned towards him favourably when the Second World War broke out. The Muslim community had been carrying the tools of ideology with it, since the debacle of 1857, and now the necessary materials were supplied by the peculiar prevailing circumstances. And the building was ready to be made. The economic downturn of the 1930s weakened the British hold and after the breakout of World War II, the signs of British departure became more visible. With these developments prospects of the emergence of Muslim state became prominent. A storm slowly brewed up. Jinnah started using the language of Ch. Rahmat Ali and Ahmad Bashir (Moore, 1983) In the meantime, the Muslims living in the Muslim majority provinces joined the Muslims living in the Muslim minority provinces. They had realized that in a strong political centre, their interests would be jeopardized by the Congress (INC). The global economic downturn made the situation worse, as a result of it, the conflict between the Hindu and the Muslims communities intensified (Ahmad, 1991). The shrewd mercantile and industrial class under the leadership of Jinnah took over the leadership of the Muslim League (Ahmad, 1991). The Muslim League membership went on increasing enormously that it touched the figure of half a million. The Muslim League launched the idea of an independent Muslim state. After the erosion of the notion of Khalafit, one main plank of the Muslim politics, the idea of an independent Muslim state captured the imagination of Muslims quickly. "The Phantom of an Islamic state has haunted the Musalman throughout the ages and is a result of the memory of the glorious past when Islam rising like a storm...instantly enveloped the World" (Munir, 1954). The Muslim League paraded this symbol ingeniously. They received a tremendous response to their utter astonishment. "The overwhelming, almost unanimous support eagerly offered to the Pakistan conception, the swiftness with which the idea succeeded in becoming actualized, the intensity of the emotions involved, apparently surprised even the political leaders themselves (Smith, 1957). Our contention is that in the environment in which the prospects of the British

departure became evident the inherent idea of separate Muslim state the symbol of Muslim corporate identity sprouted quickly. Soon it turned into a whirlwind and almost every subgroup of the Muslim community was sucked into it and who refused to give in was sidelined by the Community. That is why when Lahore resolution was adopted on 23 March 1940 it took seven years to become a reality. It means the train which took off from Kanpur in 1913 when reached Lahore in 1940 was welcomed by the Muslim community because this time situation was different.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Both India and Pakistan should realize that they cannot deconstruct the identities but by accepting the reality they can turn SAARC to be a prominent factor in the new World order. Now the effective unit of the industrial system needs extension and changes in the political field for the realization of its inner potential (Toynbee, 1948). By softening their border following the example of the European Union, Both India and Pakistan can open up new vistas for the economic progress. The world is passing through a transitional phase, if they miss this opportunity it will be another tragedy for this region.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

My utmost thanks to Allah who enabled me to complete this work. I am very thankful to my teachers for their valuable guidance. I am extremely obliged to Sahibzada Abdul Rasool (former director education Sargodha), Professor Muhammad Aslam (former chairman Punjab University) and Professor Saood Ahmad Khan for giving me encouragement to do research work. I am thankful to Khan Bashir Rafiq for providing me important references. I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to Sheikh Rahmatullah Sahib and Usman Chini Sahib for their moral support.

I am also thankful to Dr Sara Ansari and Barbara Metcalf for giving me useful advice. I feel extremely obliged to Professor Mushir Hasan and Professor Frances Robinson. I got the opportunity to delve deep into their works which gave me the insight to prepare my paper. I am very thankful to Khawaja Abdul Quddus. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my parents.

#### **REFERENCES**

- Ahmad, S. N. (1991). *Origins of Muslim consciousness in India*. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, pp, 120, 130, 246.
- Ansari, S. F. (1992). *Sufi saints and state power* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77.

- Ahmad, S. N. (1991). *Origins of Muslim consciousness in India*. New York. Greenwood Publishing group, 84.
- Ansari, S.F. 1992). *Sufi Saints and state power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Abid, Q & Massarat A. (2008). Muslim League, Jinnah And Hindu Mahasabha, *J.R.S.P.*, 45(1), 148.
- Ahmad, S. N. (1991). *Origins of Muslim consciousness in India*. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 170.
- Batalvi, A. H. (1978). *Iqbal ke aakhri do saal*. Lahore: Iqbal Academy, pp, 395, 398.
- Civil and Military Gazzette*, Lahore. (1933, April 8).
- Gandhi, R. (2000). *Understanding the Muslim mind*. India: Penguin Book India.
- Gilani, Manazir Ahsan. (1416, Hijra). *Ihata darul uloom deoband mein bite huia din*. Karachi: Publisher Maktaba Hummadiyya, 25-26.
- Gilmartin, D. (1988). *Shahidganj mosque incident, Islam, politics and social movements*. California: University of California Press, pp. 102, 154, 156, 163, 485-517.
- Ghose, Sankar. (1993). *Jawahar Lal Nehru*. New Delhi: Allied Publisher limited, p. 45.
- Gould, W. (2004). *Hindu Nationalism and the language of politics in Late Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p-93.
- Hamid, A. (1971). *Muslim separatism in India*. Lahore: Oxford University Press, p.192.
- Ikram, S.M. (1992). *Indian Muslims and partition of India*. New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher and Distributors, 7, 153, 162, 170, 174, 175, 233, 372, 454.
- Iyenger, A. S. (2001). *Role of the press and Indian freedom struggle*. New Delhi: A.P.H Publishing Corporation, 75.
- Jalal, A. (2000). *Self and sovereignty*. Great Britain: Routledge, 88.
- Johnson, G., & Seal, A. (1973). *Locality province and nation, an essay on Indian Politics 1870-1940*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 8, 38, 45, 111.
- Khaliquzzeman. C. (1961). *Pathway to Pakistan*. Lahore: Longmans.
- Kashmiri. S. (n.d.). *Syed atta ullah*. Lahore Mutboaatechataan, p. 74.
- Lelyveld, D. (1989). Disenchantment at Aligarh: Islam and the realm of the secular in late nineteenth-century India in *die Welt des islands*, New Series Bd., 22, (¼), 85-102.
- Lavan, S. (1974). *The Kanpur Incident of 1913: the north Indian Muslim press and Its Reaction to Community crisis*, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 42(2), 263-274
- Madras Mail. (1933, April 7).
- Moore, J. (1983). Jinnah and the Pakistan demand, *Modern Asian Studies*, 17(4), 529-561
- Muhammad. S. (2002). *Education and politics from Sir Syed to the present day (The Aligarh School)*. New Delhi: APH Publishing Society, p. 75.
- Munir Report. (1954). Report of the court of inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab disturbance of 1953. Lahore: Government of Punjab, 231.
- Ozcan, A. (1997). *Pan Islamism Indian Muslims, the Ottoman & Britain*, New York: Leiden, pp. 7, 64-65, 72, 116
- Qureshi, N. (1999). *Pan Islamism in Britain Indian Politics*, Boston, Leiden: Brill, 1, 14-15, 33, 51, 58, 232, 364, 384, 415.
- Rahman, M. (1970). *From consultation to confrontation: a study of the Muslim league in British Indian politics, 1906-1912*. London: Luzac, p. 228.
- Reetz, D. (1980). Enlightenment and Islam, *Indian Historical Reviews*, XIV (1-2), 206-218
- Robb, G. (1999), Muslim Identity And separatism in India, *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies*, 54 (01), 104-125
- Robinson, R. (1974). *Separatism among Indian Muslims, The politics of the united provinces Muslims, 1860-1923*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp-164, 236
- Robinson, R. (2000). *Islam and Muslim history in South Asia*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 178, 222, 226
- Robinson, R. (1993). Technology and Religious change; Islam and the Impact of Print, *Modern Asian Studies*. 27(1), 243
- Roy, O. (2004). *Globalised Islam the search for the new ummah*. London: C. Hurts and Co. Ltd., 41.
- Schimmel, A. (1963). *Gabriel's Wings, A study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal*. Leiden: E.J, Brill, pp-18, 28,29.
- Seal, A. (1973), Imperialism and Nationalism, *Modern Asian Studies*, 17(3), 321-347
- Shahid, R. (2007), All India Muslim League; split and reunification, *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, XXVIII (1), 156-168
- Shahid, D. Muhammad. (2007). *Tareekh-e-Ahmadiyyat*,

- history of ahmadiyyat*. Amritsar, edition 6, 106.
- Smith, W.C. (1957). *Islam in modern history*. New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 41, 208, 210, 256.
- The Sunday Times, (1933, April 9).
- Talbot, I. (1988). *Punjab and the raj: 1847-1947*. Delhi: Manohar, p.69.
- Talbot, I. (2000). *India and Pakistan*. London. OUP, p. 122.
- Watt, M. (1964) *Studia Islamica*, No (21) 5-12
- Wolpert, S. (2001). *Gandhi's Passions*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 43.
- Wilcox, A., & Embree. A. (2004). *The Reminiscences of sir zafrulla khan*. USA: Oriental Publishers, 33-34.
- Wilcox, A., & Embree. A. (2004). The reminiscences of sir zafrulla khan. USA: Oriental Publishers, pp-34.
- Zakaria, R. (2004a). *The Man who divided India*. Mumbai: Popular Parakashan pvt Ltd., 16, 37.
- Zakaria, R. (2004b). *Indian Muslims: where have they gone wrong*. Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhvan, p. 211.