




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DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA AND PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

India and China, two eminent powers of Asia present unique chemistry of conflictual and cooperative relationship. The war of 1962, which led to 15 years of diplomatic stalemate and the longstanding territorial conflict on the Himalayan border, is the hallmark of Sino-Indian bilateral relations. Nevertheless, since the revival of political relations by 1978, till the present state of affairs, frequent high-level exchange of visits, and steadfastness in all areas of cooperation show that both countries are focusing more on commonality and less on dissonance at bilateral level. However, at the regional level particularly in strategic calculus of South Asia, the proclamation of Sino-Indian relations—despite their commitments to cooperate and bring mutual consensus—are different from actions. Looking at Sino-Indian relations under the realm of “Greater South Asia” and Indian Ocean, the intentions and statements of China and India are also poles apart. Therefore, while keeping in view the unprecedented changes in the strategic calculus of Sino-Indian relations and South Asian Strategic Triangle of Sino-India-Pakistan, there are vast implications for Pakistan. Owing to growing misunderstanding between Pakistan-India relations on the one hand and Pakistan-China deepening relations particularly after the landmark China-Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement on the other hand, Indian attitude seems catastrophic in the future regional sustainable peaceful environment. Hence, this study extensively evaluates Sino-Indian bilateral relations regarding its historical and contemporary developments. Simultaneously, the paper presents a debate on the implications Pakistan in the perspective of South Asian Strategic Triangle of Sino-India-Pakistan. It concludes that all three players will have to work jointly for the stable mutually beneficial relationship and the regional development.

Keywords: Line of Actual Control, Narendra Modi, Pakistan, Sino-Indian Relations, South Asian, South Asian Strategic Triangle of Sino-India-Pakistan, Strategic Calculus, Strategic Partnership, Xi Jinping.

INTRODUCTION

India and China are two eminent emerging Asian powers. They began the journey of cordial bilateral relations by the year of 1949. However, the direct military adventure of 1962 caused to freeze the bilateral bond diplomatically till the 1980s. The leadership of India and China under Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping respectively reframed their foreign policies and played an active role to restore the diplomatic ties mainly in view of changes in the regional political arena and rapidly increasing global interdependence. During the post-Cold War era, the thaw gradually grounded the

strong Sino-Indian relationship mostly in terms of trade and commerce. The incident of 9/11 and subsequent situation brought the two countries even closer particularly in the framework of strategic partnership of 2005, whereby two sides made substantial progress in diversified fields.

Nevertheless, though the recent history and current developments considerably manifest ambitious plans for furthering strategic partnership, the persistency of confrontations at the Line of Actual Control (LoAC), along with the new developments in regional spheres, implicitly and explicitly making the proclamations dubious. Therefore, the chemistry of collaborative working-relationship in spite of long-standing boundary conflict and emerging trends in the region of South Asia,

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demands a closer appraisal of the two states relationship, and their likely implications for South Asian region with particular focus on Pakistan.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

First Fifty Years of Bilateral Relations – (1949-1999)

India was the first country, who recognized People's Republic of China as an independent socialist country (Bhola, 1986). Until 1958, Sino-Indian bilateral interaction has been witnessed as "honeymoon" during which both countries cooperated with each other in the light of Peaceful Co-existence policy (Ruisheng, 2011). Several friendly exchanges and agreements, particularly, the trade agreement and *Panchsheel*/five principles of peaceful co-existence, put forward at Bandung Conference in 1954, are the highlights of "honeymoon" period. However, the bilateral relations were starting sour after the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama took asylum in India as the response of rising tension between Tibetans and Chinese authorities in 1959. Along with Tibetan tension, the Sino-Indian disagreement on the demarcation of boundary line as the result of failed talks on border settlement,ⁱ turned the cordial relationship towards distrust and then intense hostility (Sali, 1998). The boundary dispute flared up, and in consequence of direct war of 1962, era of mutual antagonism and the diplomatic deadlock started.

During the course of early 1970s, the limited direct trade ties between the two countries was reported (Deepak, 2005; Singh, 2005), nevertheless, the factors at national and regional levels were the real driving force, which paved the way towards rapprochement between the two countries. The appointment of ambassadors from both sides in 1976 was the first manifestation toward practical effort to normalize bilateral relations after 15 years of diplomatic stalemate. The major breakthrough, however, came after the Rajiv Gandhi's appointment as the new Indian Prime Minister. As a young leader, he was eager to improve India's relations with developing countries, which particularly include neighboring countries i.e. Pakistan and China (Deepak, 2005). Meanwhile, the tension during the Sumdorong Chu crisis of 1986-1987, also demonstrated the need toward maintaining de-escalation of tension, when despite real danger of war, both states preferred negotiation instead of all-out war, and decided to restart negotiation on the boundary conflict (Sawhney, 2002; Lu, 2007).ⁱⁱ With the milestone visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in

December 1988 to China, the era of bilateral readjustments was ushered. According to some analysts, this visit by such a high dignitary was first of the kind in 34 years after Nehru's 1954 visit to China. Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China, who was 84 years old at the time of his meeting to PM Rajiv Gandhi, said "...the real beginning in improvement should be credited to your visit, therefore we have to thank you... You are the future. We are receding into history. There is a new generation of leaders now, and a global desire to live in peace and end conflict and tension" (Deepak, 2005). At the end of the visit, both sides were agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) to seek reasonable and mutually acceptable solution on the boundary question. Besides, to establish a Joint Economic Group (JEG) on Economic relations, Trade, Science and Technology, was also agreed by the both sides. Later the reciprocal visit by Premier Li Peng to India in 1991 and the subsequent endeavors by both sides developed the trend of de-linking the boundary question from mutual cooperation in all fields. The signing of Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC) in September 1993 and signing of agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the Border Areas on 1996 (Lu, 2007), are two historical steps, which further reduced the possibility of military crises along LoAC (Dixt, 1996; Athwal, 2008). Thus, *thaw* created in wake of PM Rajive Gandhi visit, and the overall period of 1988-1999, mainly witnessed, discussing commonality rather than dissonance in terms of bilateral relations.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The successful Indian nuclear explosions in 1998 reckoned a hostile welcome to the new century, it disturbed the nuclear balance of power in South Asian region and caused to bring Pakistan-China closer in terms of security cooperation. Nevertheless, the top leadership of both countries tactfully coped up with the emerging situation, and no direct setback on Sino-Indian bilateral relations occurred. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh visited China on June 1999 and it was reiterated by the both sides that 'neither country is a threat to the other' (India-China Bilateral Relations, Embassy of India, Beijing). In the aftermath of 9/11, both India and China incepted a dialogue mechanism on counter-terrorism (Deepak, 2005). The year 2003 witnessed expansion of cooperation in many fields with

particular focus on trade. During the Prime Minister Vajpayee visit to China in June 2003, Joint Study Group (JSG) was established in order to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded trade and economic cooperation (China, India agree on “strategic partnership”, Chinese Embassy, 2014). During the 2005 visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India, mutual consensus of expanding the relations in cultural exchanges as well as beyond bilateral to regional and global levels took place. In this visit, both heads of states signed Joint Statement for establishing a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (*The Hindu*, 11 April 2005), and the term, “strategic partners” was formally pronounced first time ever since the inception of diplomatic relations between the both states. In the year 2005, Indian Politician Jairam Ramesh coined word “Chindia” to signify growing “economic convergence” (economic interdependence) and economic prowess of China and India (Sharma, 2009; Gancheng, 2009).

In the following years, in consequence of frequent high-level exchange of visits, Sino-Indian relations had shown full swing. For instance, on the visit of Premier Hu Jintao to India in November 2006, the agreement on “ten pronged strategy” was mutually signed to ensure comprehensive development of bilateral relationship (Press Information Bureau, Government of India). Besides, the year of 2006 was marked as “Sino-Indian Friendship Year”. In January 2008, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to China, the two governments agreed upon, “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century”. In the same year, Indian Prime Minister (PM) again visited China to participate in the 7th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in October 25-29. The two countries’ armed forces also held the Joint Training Exercises in the year 2007 and 2008.

In 2010, the trade volume between the two countries was reached the figure of US\$ 60 billion which was quite higher than the set target of US\$ 40 billion for the same year. Both states set the new target of bilateral trade as US\$100 billion by the year of 2015 (Embassy of India, Beijing, “India-China Bilateral Relations”).

In 2011, PM Manmohan Singh decision to visit Sanya to participate in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit reinforced the idea that both states are interested to enhance cooperative relationship, despite of having new or older irritancies. As the decision to attend BRICS summit was taken place

despite persistent Indian protests on China’s issuing stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir, that was a fresh irritant between the two states (Wasi, 2009; Borah, 2011). The stalemate in Annual Defense Dialogues and Military exchanges happened after visa issue was also removed when Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited India in September 2012 and defense cooperation between the two countries was resumed afterwards (“Joint Press Communiqué, 2012). Similarly, in January 2012, border talks again started for removing misunderstandings about the uncertain situation along the LoAC that arises time to time.

In March 2013, newly elected Chinese president Xi Jinping met with then Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh during the BRICS Summit, held in South Africa and both sides agreed to stimulate economic relations further (*The China Daily*, 16 September 2014). The first visit of Premier Li Keqiang’s to India after taking office took place on 18-20 May 2013. The visit was just after a fresh Sino-Indian military stand off on the western sector of the China-India border during mid-April 2013, which ended up through an agreement on the resolution of the border spat (*Xinhua*, 7 May 2013). Prior to the Premier visit the regular visit by Indian Foreign Minister to China on 10 May 2015 drew significant international attention mainly because it was happened just after the border incident. The three-day visit by the Chinese Premier was ended with the establishment of vision for enhanced future development of Sino-Indian strategic cooperative partnership (Ministry of External Affairs, 23 October 2013). At bilateral level, along with ongoing projects, maritime security and peaceful usage of civil nuclear energy program were added as new area of cooperation (Ministry of External Affairs, 23 October 2013).

According to Joint statement issued by Ministry of External Affairs of both countries, the year of 2014 marked as the “Year of Friendly Exchanges” and decided to celebrate the “60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*Panchsheel*)”. Also it was reported that the bilateral consultation also included consultation on Afghanistan, West Asia, Africa, counter terrorism, Central Asia, maritime affairs and disarmament. However, the most significant anticipated outcome of the 2013 Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India was the regionally and globally focused cooperation plan. For instance while focusing on regional initiatives,

both states committed cooperation under the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar) Forum, and BCIM Economic Corridor. In addition, it was widely accepted that multilateral cooperation will be expanded through regional organizations such as East Asia Summit (EAS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was regarded important for enhancing affable relations with their common neighbors, promoting mutual beneficial policies and achieving win-win outcomes. China and India shared common interests on numerous issues of global significance including climate change, Doha development round of WTO, food security, reform of the international financial institutions and global governance (Ministry of External Affairs, 23 October 2013). Onset of new millennium, the trend of regular yearly bilateral exchanges by the top leaderships, and cooperative attitude in regional and international structures, shows that India and China have successfully set the notion of cordiality in terms of states' relations in front of international community.

Sino-India Relations under the Leadership of Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi

In the sideline of BRICS Summit in Brazil on 14 July 2014, the first meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi took place and both sides pledged to join hands for cooperation in future. Nevertheless, the President Xi Jinping's first states visit to India on 17-19 September 2014, witnessed tension steamed up on the border a week ago. However, the meeting between the new leadership went smooth. In fact, before starting the visit, Prime Minister Modi set a very positive tone, on one of his Twitter messages, "I would like to give a new terminology to my tomorrow's meeting with the Chinese President. I call it "Inch towards Miles". INCH that is "India-China"; towards MILES that is- "Millennium of Exceptional Synergy." I believe that tomorrow's meeting will mark a happy beginning towards this goal of "Inch towards Miles" ("Modi's Inch' & Miles mantra for India-China relations, n.d.).

The two countries signed 16 bilateral MoUs on different areas, including railways, five year trade and economic plan, audio-visual co-production between broadcasting ministries, agreement on administrative and custom matters, space research, agreement on cooperation on cultural institutions, agreement on publications, food and drug cooperation ("List of Documents signed during

the State Visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India, n.d). Agreement on establishing sister city relationship between Mumbai and Shanghai and Agreement on establishing sister city relationship between Ahmedabad and Guangzhou; and establishment of sister province/state relationship between Gujrat and Guangdong also signed. China announced the establishment of two industrial parks - in the western Indian state of Gujarat and the central state of Maharashtra - that produce power transmission equipment and auto parts. Both countries decided to begin discussions on civil nuclear energy and signed a five-year economic and trade development plan. The Chinese will invest US\$ 20 billion in India in the next 5 years in various industrial and infrastructure development projects.

The year 2015 marked as the "Visit India Year" in China and 2016 as the "Visit China Year" in India. Annual exchange of 200 youth from 2015 to 2019, was decided (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2014). Both states exchanged views on boundary question and reiterated their commitment to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the boundary question. The agreement on holding maritime cooperation dialogue in order to exchange views on maritime affairs and security, including anti-piracy, freedom of navigation and cooperation between maritime agencies of both countries was signed. Both agreed to hold the consultations on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control at an early date. While having a look at agreed points, one can analyze that the visit was a success at both sides with most important development of starting a discussion on the Civil Nuclear Cooperation in future. The both states media regarded the visit of Xi Jinping as beginning of new era of the bilateral relations.

The reciprocal visit of PM Narendra Modi to Xi, which is one of China's four ancient capitals and President Xi Jinping's hometown, took place from 14-16 May 2015. PM Modi signed US\$ 22 billion worth of deals with China in the fields of research, infrastructure, education and other areas (*Daily Times*, 18 May 2015). Similar to the previous visit, the present visit also began with catchy statements by the PM Modi who in his message on Weibo — a cross network between Face-book and Twitter said, "Hello China! Looking forward to interacting with Chinese friends through Weibo" (Lintao, 2015). PM Modi also introduced "selfi diplomacy" or

“digital diplomacy” during his visit to China, as the picture of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping taken by Modi’s cell-phone created lots of buzzing in social media around the world. This step was taken to reach out the largest portion of world’s population of China (Chopra, 2015). Having a detailed look over the current state-to-state relations between China and India, it has been explored that at bilateral level, it is in the national interests of both states to establish persistent friendly ties. According to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Staff Report (2014), despite longstanding unresolved boundary issue or new irritants such as stapled visa issue, unbalance trade (which are at the fore front), or the emerging potential water issueⁱⁱⁱ, both states are convinced to settle every bilateral issue through peaceful way of negotiations.

Nevertheless, at regional level particularly in strategic calculus of South Asia, there is contrast difference of statements and actions and the bilateral relationship mostly exhibit conflict instead of cooperation and struggle for power. Both India and China are seeking strictly to acquire the national interests in South Asia without compromising. However, the nature of behavior and strategic thinking is different in the strategic calculus of South Asia that is stated below under the sub-headings of Sino and Indian views respectively.

SINO-INDIAN VIEWS IN THE STRATEGIC CALCULUS OF SOUTH ASIA

China’s View

Although China’s foreign policy does not depict a clear strategic thinking regarding South Asian region, nevertheless, in light of its “Good Neighborhood” policy, China’s increased diplomatic and economic engagements in South Asia are aimed to enhance its strategic influence in the region (Chung, 2009). Since 2003, its economic engagements in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are however, rapidly growing. For instance, trade has grown “from US\$40 billion to US\$85 billion during 2006-2011” and bilateral investment has expanded and risen from “US \$500 million in 2005 to US\$2.8 billion in 2010” (Brunjes et al, 2013).

China is focusing on construction of a chain of airfields and ports at Gwadar-Pakistan, Hambantota-SriLanka, Sittwe-Myanmar, and Chittagong-Bangladesh, as per Booz Allen’s theory, it calls “string of pearls” strategy, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf come in the category of pearls (Yang, 2011). However, China while

denying such claims stressed that objective of the initiatives is to enhance regional connectivity for mutual benefits (Tiezzi, 2014). China’s main interests revealed with the introduction of 21st Maritime Silk Road Silk and Road Economic Belt (One belt, one road) initiative. Launched in 2013, ‘one belt, one road’ mainly aims to connect, East Asia and European, the two economic circles of the world, with the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa (*Xinhuanet*, 2015). China has approved the development of a trans-Karakoram corridor through Pakistan, proposed transport links with Myanmar, Bangladesh, and planned to build a new Silk Road industrial belt between China and Central Asia (Mohan, 2014). Chinese President Xi Jinping has assured to raise annual bilateral trade with South Asia to US\$150 billion in the next five years and invest US\$30 billion in South Asia over five years (Daniel &Kumar, 2014). With the passage of time, it has been observed that China under its charismatic leadership has been successfully developing its South Asian strategy based on the concepts of “infrastructure development” and “human security” with great assertiveness and pragmatism than its predecessors.

India’s View

While analyzing the South Asian framework in view of India’s ambitions, South Asia has been specifically an indo-centric region, whereby since the partition of the Subcontinent and decolonization, India has been trying to have influence over the small states other than Pakistan and hold almost complete sway over SARRC setup. As defining Indian strategic environment, the former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee once stated, “India’s strategic environment extends from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, across the entire Indian Ocean, including Northwest Central Asia and Afghanistan, East Asia, China and Southeast Asia. Our strategic thinking must be extended to these horizons Line” (*Indian Express*, 7 November 2003).

The proof of strong Indian influence can be seen with respect to some South Asian countries in its neighborhood. For instance, it has strengthened its influence on Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh and has been increasing engagement in Afghanistan (Goswami, 2014). India has never built its bilateral relations on equal footing with its neighbors (Behuria et al, 2012). Besides, owing to the traditional and non-traditional territorial differences with almost all periphery states, Indian strong defence and diplomatic arrangements

always dominates its national character in the small states of South Asia.

Looking at Sino-Indian relations under the realm, of "Greater South Asia," which insists for the inclusion of Iran, China, and Myanmar (Hussain, 2012). India and China individually have been expanding their relations with Iran and Myanmar for getting energy resources. In the case of Iran, India is helping Iran to establish its Port of Chabahar as an alternative energy route in Indian Ocean adjacent to Gwadar port of Pakistan. In the case of Myanmar, as a part of Southeast Asia, has been a gateway for India's and China's strategic and economic interests. Over the last few years, China's extensive military linkages and assistance of constructing naval ports are greatly causing serious concerns in India (Jetly, 201). Indian new government is watching Chinese activities in Myanmar with magnifying glass as China wants major stronghold in the Indian Ocean region through this piece of land, which is being taken as a bridge between SAARC and ASEAN (*Russian Radio*, August 15, 2014.).

Similarly, to understand the concept of greater South Asia in changing geopolitical and geo-economic standpoint, its terrestrial and marine should take into consideration (Xiaoping, 2012: 80). Owing to the fact that Indian Ocean has got very significant worth in the major states' maritime strategy at the backdrop of growing suspicious state of overland pipelines, the dependence on sea transportation, the Indian Ocean is considered an energy corridor, thus, depicts a new theater of Sino-Indian rivalry (Tariq, 2014: 8). As part of their strategic influence, the definitional aspect of Indian Ocean by Chinese and Indian academia poles apart. As contrary to Indian perception of India's Ocean, Chinese academia considered the South Asian maritime boundary as stretched out from Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and the Rokko Strait (Japan), Pacific Ocean (Xiaoping, 2012).

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA AND PAKISTAN

While having a glance over the development at Sino-Indian bilateral relations, respecting implications for South Asian region and Pakistan, there are two schools of thought, the optimists and the opponents.

The **Optimists** says that Sino-Indian partnership exhibits a well-thought-through strategy as a revised peaceful coexistence policy that Sino-India overall relations will be improved in future (Siddiqi, 2012). This

school of thought favors that both can play a vital role in maintaining political stability, peace, and expanding economic cooperation and integration mechanism in the region of South Asia in particular and in Asia in general. Both can cooperate to combat with terrorism which has become the most appalling challenge to South Asian security as well as the alarming threat to the entire world. It is considered that its center lies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, Xi leadership is seeking to reinforce its peaceful coexistence with India and Pakistan along with other South Asian countries so that an integrative security mechanism could be developed to safeguard its peripheries, adjacent to South Asia from terrorist activities in the post-2014 era. In this regard, China needs to define its dynamic role in traditional South Asian Strategic Triangle (SAST) of India-China-Pakistan for balancing the power equilibrium in the region. Hence, China is in favor that India must normalize its ties with Pakistan so that all regional and trans-regional players can effectively counter terrorism, which is a great trouble for economic development and regional integration of the South Asian region with Central Asia and Southeast Asia through the infrastructure developmental strategy in light of Silk Road Economic Belt and Corridors.

Nevertheless, the **Opponents** and realists suggests exacerbating confrontation between India and China in the days to come because of couple of reasons:

- Firstly, a tremendous economic boom and bust no longer put the basic grievances (due to territorial conflicts) on the backburner.
- Secondly, in the canvas of South Asian region it has been analyzed, for the vested interest, as India under its "Look East policy" has strong bonds with Nepal, Burma, and Maldives, and is expanding its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia on the one hand and in the Central Asia via Afghanistan on the other hand.
- Thirdly, at the same time, China is tilting towards Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the pursuit of its "string of pearls" policy. China's role in South Asia can never be balanced as its clear strategic inclination with long-term goals is considerably towards Pakistan and economic leaning with defined objectives is tremendously towards India.
- Fourthly, however, in fact, there are still some segments in US and India, which consider China a

peer competitor in Asia and want to contain it.

- Fifthly, Indian strategic circles are of opinion that China's plan is to "encircle" India by both land and sea with consolidating its footings in South Asian countries.
- Sixthly, in the post-2014 era, as power vacuum will create in Afghanistan after withdrawal of U.S-led NATO forces, a new confrontation for fulfilling the gap in Afghanistan can start between India and China. This may be the next another 'Great Game' in Afghanistan between the two Asian players, as it had been in past between global players i.e. Britain and the Soviet Russia.

Similarly, practically confidence is yet to be established in Sino-India moves in the UNSC, as despite of China-India pledges of cooperation on counter terrorism, China is not ready to blindly support India. For instance, India's effort to seek United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin, faced obstruction from China, when China stopped Indian proposal by objecting on 'technical holds' (The Hindu, 26 May 2015). Whereas Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj during the press conference on the occasion on completion of one year of Indian government under Modi leadership, while responding a question directly blamed China for putting a hold on sanctions against Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin, which is not an act of cooperation on Chinese part.

Similarly, China have a long way to be ready to extend unequivocal support to India's bid to become a permanent member. As, analysis are of the view that besides, a setback to China's own power and prestige, it can disturb Sino-Pakistan all-weather relations (Kaura, 2015).

Implications for Pakistan in Perspective of Strategic Triangle of Sino-India-Pakistan in South Asian

While looking at the backdrop of Sino-India chequered history of bilateral relations and present state of dysfunctional relations, there are enormous implications for Pakistan. Pakistan adheres the fact that smooth Sino-India relations are a great source of peace and tranquility in the region. Most pertinently, the every passing day mounting misunderstanding between Pakistan-India relations possess a dilemma for the sustainable peace and security of the region. Regarding the 'belt and road' initiative and Pakistan's decision to join it through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC), the Indian administration has clearly shown its reservations on the plan. The current developments in India and Pakistan relations, particularly since the recent halt in the bilateral talks, and after clear evidences about the direct involvement of Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) in Pakistan, forecasting a complex future.

The Pakistani defense experts since a long time have been raising the issue of Indian involvement in Pakistan, which is halting the peace efforts and creating hurdles in the development of Pakistan. The two significant incidents in this regard were the Safoora massacre in Karachi and killing of 19 innocent labor workers by militants in Mastung, Baluchistan. It is widely believed by the analysts that such incidents are sheer effort to sabotage Pakistan's security environment in order to halt CPEC long term plan of development of energy and infrastructure in Pakistan (Mirza, 2015). It was also stated by some analysts that these incidents could put the question mark on the on-going security operation in tribal areas and put hindrances in the way of CPEC. A fewer view that these incidents are the backlash of military operations in Karachi and Baluchistan.

In this fashion, when the Indian Defense minister, Manohar Parrikar himself stated, "We have to neutralize terrorists through terrorists only. Why can't we do it? We should do it" (Singh, 2015). And the Mastung incident on May 29, 2015, reinforced the Baluchistan government adherences of involvement of Indian intelligence agency RAW in the incident (RAW involved in Mastung tragedy: Baluchistan Interior Minister, n.d.). As in response to Indian Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, Rajyavardhan Rathore's statement^{iv}, General Raheel Sharif stated, "No one should dare cast an evil eye on Pakistan. We will defeat the enemy designs and defend Pakistan's territorial integrity at any cost" (Yousaf, 2015). Moreover, he stated, "We are ready to pay any price to protect our nationhood and safeguard Pakistan's interests, be it Kashmir, development of new ports or exploitation of natural resources" (Dawn, June 13, 2015).

Besides, while responding to Parrikar's statements Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson Qazi Khalilullah said, "Parrikar's statements are a matter of concern for not only Pakistan but the entire region and the whole world" (*The Statesman*, May 29, 2015). While referring to CPEC he stated, "Pakistan is well aware of India's alleged plans to sabotage the China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor (CPEC) project and its campaign against the corridor” (Haider, 2015). This is in fact distressing despite Pakistan’s all efforts to fight and cooperate against terrorism, Pakistan had been negatively projected by India especially related to cross-border terrorism in Xinjiang and in the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Whereas, it is simply ironical that Pakistan has borne the consequences of terrorism since the US-led global war on terrorism in Afghanistan. During the 2nd All Parties Conference (APC) on 29 May 2015, all political parties of Pakistan reached on the consensus with the government of Nawaz Sharif on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), prolonged route controversy (*The Statesman*, May 29, 2015). Nevertheless, the situation depicts that Pakistan still have a long way to successfully utilize the time span of 10-20 years through short-term to mid-term and then long-term targets under CPEC.

The Chinese stance over the bilateral relations of Sino-Indian relation and Pakistan-China long term cooperation under CPEC is, however to this end, seems persistent and clear. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, while responding the question during regular press conference on June 1, 2015, on Indian allegations on CPEC that it might go through the disputed area of Kashmir, was that “the Kashmir issue is primarily an issue left over by history between India and Pakistan, and should be properly settled by the two countries through dialogue and consultation. The cooperation between China and Pakistan in relevant region is for the sole purpose of boosting local economic and social development. It does not target any third party, nor will it affect different parties’ positions on the relevant issue” (Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference, 2015). While responding to the Pakistan-India deteriorating relations and Sino-India improvement in bilateral relations, the Chinese analyst Prof. Dr. Xia Ming^v stated, “improvement of Sino-Indian relationship wouldn’t be at the cost of Sino-Pakistan relationship. Most likely, China would maintain a skewed balance of power in more favor of Pakistan” (personal communication with Xia Ming via e-mail, 9 July 2014).

CONCLUSION

Keeping in view the growing Sino-Indian strategic relations and its implications for South Asia and Pakistan, in nutshell, it can be concluded that the present

nature of Sino-Indian relations shed light on the glaring side of their bilateral relations in future. Nevertheless, relations with neighboring states particularly with Pakistan, divergence of interests in the greater South Asia and Indian Ocean, may lead the two Asian giants toward new constraints. Therefore, an urgent need is that both nations should work for comprehensive enduring relations in future. It is noteworthy that the strong bond of strategic relations is a substantive feature of China-Pakistan “all-weather” and “time-tested” strategic partnership. Thus, it can be recommended that China and India both should go side by side for reinforcing and normalizing their existing relations while considering strategic significance of Pakistan. According to the analysts and experts of international affairs, this integration is possible with the expansion of South Asian region and inclusion of China into the SARRC, similarly as both India and Pakistan have been become full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All three players will have to work for stable relations in the fields of economics as well as in the field of security. Another outcome of the present study is that apparently it seems that despite having challenges, the power equilibrium has tilted towards Pakistan in South Asia since Pakistan has embraced the long-term plan of CPEC. However, India will tried its best to counterweight the balance of power with reinforcing its ‘neighborhood diplomacy’ at one side, and with the United States strategic partnership, at other side. Nevertheless, until or unless, the future of Pakistan-India relations goes smooth, and India drag its relations with all neighbors on equal footing, the Sino-Indian relations would remain despondent.

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ⁱ Three points at the Himalayan Tibetan border i.e. Eastern Sector, Middle Sector and Western were discussed during the border talks. However, the major conflicts lie in the Eastern sector which constitutes the north of Arunachal Pradesh and China claims 40,000 square kilometres of territory and at the Western sectors in the Aksai Chin district as part of Xinjiang (Sinkiang) region, where India claims that Chinese have occupied 33,000 square miles in Ladakh.

ⁱⁱ In the year of 1984, the Intelligence Bureau of India opened a post in the Sumdurong valley, which lies in the Tagla ridge north of the McMahon Line and is thus considered by China as its territory. In the mid-June 1986, China reoccupied the valley when the Indian detachment left their post for Nyamjang Chu in order to collect their salaries and rations. India condemned the Chinese action on 15 July 1986, with China answering that it was India that had violated and crossed the LoAC. Both sides deployed their armies on the border region. See Yang Lu, "Looking beyond the Border: The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations", Heidelberg Working Paper No. 31 (August 2007): 13; Pravin Sawhney, *The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that shape India's Image* (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2002), p. 29.

ⁱⁱⁱ The water dispute between China and India on Brahmaputra River (called Yarlung Tsangpo in China and originates from Tibet) is an emerging irritant. As China is building hydro-electric power plant, at place called Zangmu, which according to India is causing diversion and reduction of water flow of Brahmaputra River in India. It has been said that three more plants named Dagu, Jiacha and Jiexu are also underway. Roomana Hukil. For details see, Amitava Mukherjee, "China and India: River Wars in the Himalayas" April 1, 2014, Geopoliticalmonitor.com and "India-China: A Water War over the Brahmaputra?" IPCS paper, April 30, 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/india-china-a-water-war-over-the-brahmaputra-4415.html> (accessed 30 August 2014).

- ^{iv} He said, “This (Indian strikes in Myanmar) is a message for all countries, including Pakistan, and groups harbouring terror intent towards India. A terrorist is a terrorist and has no other identity. We will strike when we want to”. See “India will strike enemies at ‘place and time’ of its choosing, says minister,” *The Express Tribune*, June 10, 2015.
- ^v Xia Ming is a Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Centre and the College of Staten Island, the City University of New York. He is one of the leading Chinese analysts. The Boxun News Agency selected Xia Ming as one of the “Top 100 Chinese Public Intellectuals” in the years of 2009 and 2011 and again in 2010 by The Zhengyou Jingzuo Research Group based in China respectively.